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Advaita Siddhi

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  #1  
Old 03 April 2010, 11:25 AM
atanu atanu is offline
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Advaita Siddhi

Namaste friends

It has been felt that we have not seen the scholarly exposition of Advaita theories. So, let us take up Madhusudan Saraswati’s Advaita Siddhi for discussion.

I have taken full of this discussion from Shri Anand Hudli's (whom I don't know but have come to admire) excellent text and just formatted the pieces to make them suitable for pasting in this thread. Anyone interested to study the full text immediately may do so at http://www.advaitasiddhi.org/. I thank Anand, for his excellent effort. I also hope that this thread in HDF will also serve us well.

Madhusudan Saraswati does not seem to be a mere sadhu but a sadhu with a brilliant logician’s mind that can destroy any mithyAtva. In his best known work, called Advaita Siddhi, Madhusudan defined mithyAtva with three definitions that answer all possible Dvaita and Vishistaadvaita logical oppositions.

The first definition of mithyAtva says that what is mithyA is characterized by "sadasadanadhikaraNatva", not being the substratum of either sat (Existence) or asat (nonexistence).

The second definition of mithyAtva says that what is mithyA (unreal) is characterized as being the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation (asat) in the very substratum where it (the thing that is mithyA) is cognized.

The third definition in the advaita-siddhi simply says: YAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |, Unreality is the property of being sublated by knowledge or cognition.


Note: pratiyogin an adversary , rival ; any object dependent upon another and not existing without it ; a partner , associate ; a counterpart , match .
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That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 09:20 PM.
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Old 03 April 2010, 11:27 AM
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Re: Advaita Siddhi

ADVAITASIDDHI
Madhusudana Sarasvati
Introduction
||shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
|| shrIviTThalaM namAmi ||

The advaita-siddhi is regarded as one of the most important polemical works of advaita. It is MadhusUdana sarasvatI's brilliant and successful defense of advaita in response to the objections of the MAdhvas, the dualists. Shankara states that his doctrine of brahmajnAna (brahmajnAnamapi vastutantrameva - brahma-sUtra- bhAshhya 1.1.2) is a "vastu-tantra", a doctrine based on facts, as opposed to a "purushha-tantra", a doctrine based on the knowledge of an individual. One can raise objections against individual opinions but facts cannot be objected to; they can possibly be misunderstood. One can possibly express ignorance of facts but not argue against them. So one may ask: how is it possible for the mAdhvas to raise objections against advaita that is based on facts? It is not possible. What the MAdhvas, the dvaitins, have done is to express misunderstandings, not objections.

It is, therefore, proper to answer the so-called objections of the mAdhvas by clearing their misunderstandings of advaita. But it must also be mentioned that, in some cases at least, it appears that the misunderstandings are not genuine misunderstandings but misunderstandings introduced on purpose to A) misrepresent advaita first and then, B) to try to refute the resulting misrepresentation. Nevertheless, advaitins should remove all misunderstandings, whether they be genuine or otherwise, and no advaitin has done this better than MadhusUdana SarasvatI, the great logician from Bengal.


I endeavor here to present some glimpses of the advaita-siddhi's great treasures, treasures that are to be cherished for all time. In a forum like this one, it is hard, if not impossible, to do justice to such a monumental work as the advaita-siddhi. So I will endeavor to present only a few discussions with translation, consulting the explanations of Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya in his advaita-siddhi-vyAkhyA, of BrahmAnanda in his GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghuchandrikA) commentary on the advaita-siddhi, and of ViTThala upAdhyAya in his commentary on the laghu-chandrikA. All these works, namely the advaita-siddhi, siddhi-vyAkhyA, GauDa-brahmAnandI, and also the viTThaleshopAdhyAyI commentary on the GauDa-brahmA-nandI, all in the original Sanskrit, have been edited by Pandit Anantakrishna Sastri and published by Parimal Publications, Delhi,in 1988.

A few words about the authors. MadhusUdana sarasvatI is a towering giant among advaitins. An oft quoted verse regarding him is:

madhusUdanasarasvatyAH pAraM vetti sarasvatI |
pAraM vetti sarasvatyAH madhusUdanasarasvatI ||

(Only) the Goddess of Learning, sarasvatI knows the limits of(knowledge of) MadhusUdana sarasvatI. And MadhusUdana sarasvatI knows the limits of (knowledge of) Goddess sarasvatI!

He is said to have had three illustrious gurus. He learned mImAMsA from mAdhava sarasvatI, vedAnta from rAmatIrtha, and took sannyAsa dIxA from vishveshvara sarasvatI. Apart from the advaita-siddhi which is MadhusUdana's "crest-jewel", he is said to have written numerous other works, including a lucid commentary on the gItA called gUDhArtha-dIpikA, and a work called "advaita-ratna-laxana", a refutation of the work "bheda-ratna" by the logician shankara mishra.

MadhusUdana demonstrates his ability as a master logician in the advaita-siddhi, which he wrote as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita of the mAdhva exponent, vyAsatIrtha. MadhusUdana was so accomplished in navya-nyAya (logic) techniques that the following verse is quoted about him when he visited navadvIpa, the center for learning in nyAya-shAstra.

navadvIpe samAyAte madhusUdanavAkpatau chakampe tarkavAgIshaH kAtaro .abhUd.h gadAdharaH ||

When MadhusUdana, the master of speech, came to navadvIpa, MathurAnAtha tarkavAgIsha (who was the foremost navya naiyAyika during those times) trembled (with fear) and GadAdhara (another logician of great repute) became afraid.

Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya, the author of siddhi-vyAkhyA, is said to have a been a favorite student of MadhusUdana. BrahmAnanda, the author of gauDabrahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA), wrote the work as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita-taraN^giNI of the dvaitin (dualist) rAmAchArya. BrahmAnanda was the student of nArAyaNa tIrtha, a student of MadhusUdana. Finally, ViTThalesha upAdhyAya, a brAhmaNa of the Konkan region, has also placed the followers of advaita under his debt for writing a lucid commentary on the gaUDa-brahmAnandI.
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That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 08:33 PM.
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Old 03 April 2010, 11:30 AM
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Re: Advaita Siddhi

The First Definition of Unreality
|| shrIvishhNave namaH ||

Verse 1 of the advaita-siddhi
mAyAkalpita-mAtR^itA-mukha-mR^ishhA-dvaitaprapaJNchAshrayaH satya-GYAna-sukhAtmakaH shruti-shikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharaH |
mithyA-bandha-vidhUnanena paramAnandaika-tAnAtmakaM mokshhaM prApta iva svayaM vijayate vishhNur-vikalporjjhitaH ||1 ||


Translation based on siddhivyAkhyA of Balabhadra bhaTTAchArya and GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA) of BrahmAnanda
VishhNu shines supreme, He who is the substratum (basis) of the world of duality beginning with the notion of cognizer (mAtR^i),of duality that is false and fabricated by mAyA, He whose nature is Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss, He who is realized by the undifferentiated (undivided) direct experience arising from the mahAvAkyas of vedAnta, He who by shaking off the false bonds (of mAyA) has attained, as it were, mokshha wholly consisting of supreme bliss, and He who becomes free from all variety, manifoldness (vikalpa). (1)

Review of navya nyAya concepts

A review of some concepts and terms from nyAya is in order before we proceed further. Please see "Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic" by Ingalls or "The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation" by Bimal Krishna Matilal for more details.

Process of inference: Every noneternal entity, according to nyAya, must be a result of an instrumental cause (karaNa) and an operation (vyApAra). An inference (anumAna), that is a means to knowledge of man and hence noneternal, must have an instrumental cause and an operation by which the cause brings about the inference. In the process of inference, the operation is called parAmarsha or consideration, and the instrumental cause is the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyApti), also called pervasion. This vyApti corresponds very roughly to logical implication in Western logic. In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the instrumental cause, karaNa is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance, "smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire", vahni-vyApyo dhUmaH, ie. where there is smoke there is fire.

The operation, vyApAra is the consideration (parAmarsha) that is knowledge of the occurrence of the concomitant in the subject (pakshha) where the inference is being made. In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the parAmarsha will be of the form, "the mountain possesses smoke which is an invariable concomitant of fire" - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h In polemical treatises and debates, an inference is stated tersely by listing the inference (conclusion) followed by a single word representing the application of the consideration and the invariable concomitance. For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain possesses fire because of smoke." In every inference, there are evident three terms, called 1) sAdhya or that which is to be proved, 2) the hetu or linga, the concomitant, and 3) the subject or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur. In the inference, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke", the sAdhya is vahni (fire), the hetu is smoke, and the pakshha is parvata (mountain).

In the standard form of inference, the three terms are placed as follows: pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-suffix hetu-in-ablative-case For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke." The definition of vyApti is very important. It is defined by the bhAshhA-parichchheda (of VishvanAtha) as: vyAptiH sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaMbandha udAhR^itaH | Invariable concomitance is said to be the absence of relation of the (hetu) to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya. Here the relation should be the same as the relation under consideration for the vyApti. As per this definition of vyApti, smoke is an invariable concomitant of fire (or smoke is "pervaded" by fire) because it is not the case that there is something that has smoke but not fire. However, fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke.
There are things such as a red-hot iron rod that has fire but no smoke. So fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke. A relation between two entities is often explained as the superimposition of one entity on the other. Here, the entity that is superimposed is called the superstratum or Adheya. The entity on which the Adheya is superimposed is called substratum or locus. Sanskrit names for "substratum" is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa.

In the example, bhUtale ghaTo vartate, "there is a pot on the ground", the superstratum is the pot (ghaTa), the ground (bhUtalam.h) is the substratum or locus, and the relation is "contact", saMyoga. Another way of looking at relations (saMbandha) is to differentiate between what Ingalls calls "occurrence-exacting" and "non occurrence exacting" relations. Relations such as inherence (samavAya) are always occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the relation between a whole and its parts, a genus or class (jAti) and a particular instance of the class, etc. Contact (saMyoga) can sometimes be occurrence exacting but sometimes not. In relation between two entities, one of the entities is an adjunct or pratiyogin, and the other is a subjunct or anuyogin.

If a relation is such that one entity is a locus or substratum (AdhAra) of the other which must be the superstratum (Adheya), then the AdhAra is the subjunct or anuyogin. The Adheya is the adjunct or pratiyogin. In the example, bhUtale ghaTaH, "there is a pot on the ground", ghaTa is the pratiyogin while bhUtalam.h is the anuyogin. Two types of absences (abhAva) are distinguished in navya-nyAya. One is called anyonya-abhAva that is essentially a denial of identity between to entities. The other is saMsarga-abhAva or relational absence. Here, there are three kinds: 1) prAgabhAva, the absence of a thing before it is brought into being, 2) dhvamsAbhAva, the absence of a thing after it is destroyed, and 3) atyanta-abhAva, eternal absence. The terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are also used in the context of absences. When we say "bhUtale ghaTo nAsti", "there is no pot on the ground", the pratiyogin of the absence is "ghaTa", pot, and the anuyogin is "bhUtalam.h", ground. The pratiyogin of this type should be called "abhAvIya-pratiyogin" to distinguish it from the relational adjunct, but naiyAyikas often write "pratiyogin" for both relational and absential adjuncts.

Some of the properties that are commonly used in naiyAyika literature are those that correspond to the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa (locus), vishhayin (knowledge), vishhaya (content of knowledge), visheshhya (qualificand), visheshhaNa (qualifier), prakAra (chief qualifier), etc. The abstract properties or relational abstracts of these are formed by simply adding the suffix, "tva" or "tA" to each term. For example, one may write sAdhyatva to mean "the property of being a sAdhya" or "sAdhya-ness", hetutva or "the property of being a hetu" or "hetu-ness", etc.
A sentence of the form, parvato vahnimAn.h, "the mountain (parvata) has fire (vahni)", can be first rewritten as parvato vahnyadhikaraNam.h, "the mountain is a locus or substratum of fire". This is then analyzed by the naiyAyika as follows: parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA | The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by vahni. Or parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishhThAdheyatA nirUpitA | The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by the AdheyatA (superstratum-ness) resident in fire. The most characteristic terms of navya-nyAya are "avachchhedaka" (limitor) and "avachchhinna" (limited). These terms are used in the context of relational abstracts or abstract properties. An entity, such as a pot (ghaTa), is said to be qualified by a qualifier, but a relational abstract is said to be limited by a limitor.
Let us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, "the mountain has fire." Here, the mountain is a substratum (adhikaraNa) of fire which is the superstratum (Adheya). The adhikaraNatA in parvata is described by vahni (fire), but this adhikaraNatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by parvatatva. Similarly, the AdheyatA in vahni (fire) is said to be described by parvata but this AdheyatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by vahnitva or fire-ness. So a navya-naiyAyika would write:
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatva- avachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishhThAdheyatA sA parvata-nirUpita-vahnitva-avachchhinnAdheyatA |

The adhikaraNatA in mountain is described by fire and limited by parvatatva (mountain-ness), and the AdheyatA in fire is described by mountain and limited by vahnitva (fire-ness). A generic relational abstract may also be limited. In the sentence, "a stick is the instrumental cause of a pot", daNDo nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with respect to a specific pot and stick. The assertion is generally about all sticks and pots. So the naiyAyika writes: daNDatvaM ghaTa-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h | Stick-ness is the limitor of instrumental-cause-ness described by pot.
__________________
That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.
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Old 03 April 2010, 11:31 AM
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Re: Advaita Siddhi

The first definition of mithyAtva - objections

Earlier, MadhusUdana set forth the objective of establishing the unreality (mithyAtva) of duality (dvaita), or in other words the unreality of the world (jaganmithyAtva). After a brief digression of navya-nyAya, we will now look at the first definition of mithyAtva (unreality) that comes under attack from the mAdhva opponent. This definition is the one given by PadmapAdAchArya in his PanchapAdikA.

advaita-siddhi --------------- atha

prathamamithyAtva-vichAraH | The opponent criticizes the definition of mithyAtva as follows:
nanu kimidaM mithyAtvaM sAdhyate, na tAvat.h "mithyAshabdo- anirvachanIyatAvachana" iti panchapAdikAvachanAt.h sadasad- anadhikaraNatvarUpamanirvAchyatvam.h, taddhi kiM asatva- vishishhTa-sattvAbhAvaH, uta sattvAtyantAbhAva-asattva-atyanta- abhAvarUpaM dharmadvayam.h, Ahosvit.h sattvAtyanta-abhAvavatve sati asattva-atyanta-abhAvarUpaM vishishhTam.h |

Now, what is this unreality (mithyAtva) that (you) want to infer (as characterizing the world)? This unreality is by no means non-definability as defined by the statement of the panchapAdikA that the word mithyA (unreal) is denoted by non-definability, the non-definability being of the nature of NOT being the substratum (adhikaraNa) of either existence or non-existence. What is "not being the substratum of existence or non-existence"?

Is it 1) the absence of existence qualified by non-existence or 2) the pair of attributes of (a). absolute absence of existence and (b). absolute absence of non-existence, or 3) the property of the absolute absence of nonexistence during the absolute absence of existence, ie. being a common substratum of the attributes - the absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of non-existence?

nAdyaH, sattvamAtrAdhAre jagatyasattvavishishhTasattva-anabhyu- pagamAt, vishishhTa-abhAva-sAdhane siddha-sAdhanAt.h |

(You) cannot (claim) the first (regarding the world) because the world is the substratum of only existence (sattva) and existence qualified by non-existence is not admitted. And by proving the absence of existence as qualified by non-existence, (you commit the flaw of) proving what is already established (siddha-sAdhana).

na dvitIyaH, sattva-asattvayorekAbhAve aparasattva-avashyakatvena vyAghAtAt.h, nirdharmakabrahmavatsattva-asattva-rAhitye .api sadrUpatvena amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntarAchcha, shuktirUpye abAdhyatvarUpasattva-vyatirekasya sattvena bAdhyatvarUpa-asattvasya vyatireka-asiddhyA sAdhyavaikalyAchcha |

(You) cannot (claim) the second. Because, wherever there is an absence of one of existence and nonexistence, there the presence of the other is necessary; this leads to a contradiction. (Also), the world, just like the Brahman without attributes, even being without the attributes, existence and nonexistence, by (its very) nature of existence, is established as NOT unreal; this would lead to (the defect of) arthAntara, proving something other than what is to be proved.

In the silver-in-nacre (example of illusion that is often quoted by advaitins to show the ontological status of the world), (we grant that) it (silver-nacre) is without existence whose nature is non-sublatability (noncontradicted-ness), (but) the absence of nonexistence, whose nature is sublatibility (contradicted-ness), is NOT established; this leads to the defectiveness of (your) sAdhya, what (you) seek to prove.
ata eva na tR^itIyaH, pUrvavadvyAghAtAt.h, arthAntarAtsAdhya- vaikalyAchcha

For the very same reason(s) as before, the third (alternative in defining mithyAtva, ie. the common substratum of the attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence) cannot (be claimed) because of the fallacies of contradiction (violation of the law of the excluded middle), proving something other than what is intended, and defectiveness of the sAdhya.

MadhusUdana now begins his reply thus:

iti chet.h, maivam.h
If this is what you say, it is unjustified.
__________________
That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 12:05 PM.
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  #5  
Old 03 April 2010, 11:33 AM
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Re: Advaita Siddhi

MadhusUdana's reply

Brief recap: We have seen that mithyAtva (unreality) can be defined as anirvachanIyatva (property of not being definable), and this anirvachanIyatva can further be explained as sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or nonexistence. The opponent lists three ways in which this sadasadanadhikaraNatva may be defined. He finds fault with each of these definitions. MadhusUdana disagrees and starts his counter-argument.

MadhusUdana's reply:
sattva-atyanta-abhAva-asattva-atyanta-abhAva-rUpa-dharma- dvaya-vivaxAyAM doshhAbhAvAt.h | nacha vyAhatiH |

In the intended meaning of "sadasad-anadhikaraNa" (not being the substratum of existence or nonexistence) as "the pair of attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence", there is NO defect. There is NO contradiction too. (Why?)

sA hi sattvAsattvayoH parasparaviraharUpatayA vA, paraspara- virahavyApakatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApyatayA vA |

That (contradiction could result) only if 1) existence and nonexistence mutually negate each other or 2) they mutually pervade each other's absence (one's absence is the invariable concomitant of the other), or 3) they are mutually pervaded by each other's absence (one is the invariable concomitant of the other's absence). (PS: Recall the definition of vyApti in the third part of this series.)

tatra nAdyaH, tadanaN^gIkArAt.h | tathAhyatra trikAlAbAdhyatva- sattva-vyatireko nAsattvam.h, kintu kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatva-anadhikaraNatvam.h | tadvyatirekashcha sAdhyatvena vivaxitaH |

There is no (presence of the) first condition, because it is not accepted. It is so (not accepted) because the negation of existence, that is not sublatable at any time, past, present, or future, is NOT nonexistence, but (nonexistence means) NOT being cognized as existing in any substratum (at any time). The negation of that (nonexistence) is what is intended to be (part of) what is to be proved.

tathAcha trikAlAbAdhyavilaxaNatve sati kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatvarUpaM sAdhyaM paryavasitam.h | evaMcha sati na shuktirUpye sAdhyavaikalyamapi | bAdhyatvarUpAsattvavyatirekasya sAdhyApraveshAt.h | nApi vyAghAtaH, parasparaviraharUpatva- abhAvAt.h |

The conclusion to be established is that while being different from that which is never sublatable, it is (capable of) being cognized as existing in some substratum. And this being so, there is no defect of the sAdhya's (being absent) in silver-in-nacre. (This is) because the negation of nonexistence which is sublatable (always) does not form part of what is to be established (sAdhya). (What does form part of the sAdhya is the negation of nonexistence which consists in not being cognized in any locus or substratum at any time). (Therefore,) there is no contradiction too (here) because there is no mutual negation between (existence and nonexistence).

ata eva na dvitIyo .api, sattvAbhAvavati shuktirUpye vivaxita- asattvavyatirekasya vidyamAnatvena vyabhichArAt.h |

For this reason, the second condition (under which contradiction can occur) does not hold too. (There can be no invariable concomitance of the absence of existence or nonexistence with the other.) (The requirement for such concomitance to hold is not satisfied) due to deviation (vyabhichAra), since in (illusory things such as) the silver-in-nacre, there is the absence of existence, but the absence of the nonexistence with the intended definition (as above) is also cognized. (In order for the concomitance to hold, nonexistence would have to be present when existence is absent.)

nApi tR^itIyaH tasya vyAghAta-aprayojakatvAt.h, gotva-ashvatvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayor-ushhTrAdAvekatra sahopalaMbhAt.h |

The third condition does not cause contradiction. (For example,) cow-ness (the property of being a cow) and horse-ness (property of being a horse) are invariable concomitants of each other's absence (ie. where cow-ness is present, horse-ness is absent and where horse-ness is present, cow-ness is absent). Even so, the two properties (of cow-ness and horse-ness) are NOT present in the same locus such as a camel, etc., and (the absences of cow-ness and horse-ness are) perceived thus together (in the same locus).

Balabhadra clarifies:

tatashcha sattva-asattvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayorekatra prapaJNche saMbhavAnna vyAhatiriti dhyeyam.H|

And therefore, even though existence and nonexistence are invariable concomitants of each other's absence, the absences of both CAN occur in the same place, ie. the world and due to (this) there is NO contradiction. This is to be thought of.
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That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 12:13 PM.
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  #6  
Old 03 April 2010, 11:35 AM
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Reputation: 12303
Re: Advaita Siddhi

No arthAntara

After rejecting the claim made by the opponent that the definitions of sadasadanadhikaraNatva are faulty, MadhusUdana next shows that the charge made regarding arthAntara is also not valid.

MadhusUdana's reply (continued):

yachcha - nirdharmakasya brahmaNaH sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavat- prapaJNchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- uktam.h| tanna |

And the (opponent) said: Just as the attributeless Brahman lacks existence (as an attribute) but (Its) very nature is existence, the very nature of the world too is existence. This establishes that the world is not mithyA (unreal). By this (it follows that you will have) established something other (than what you wanted to) - arthAntara. (We say): It is not so.

ekenaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau brahmavat.h prapaJNchasya pratyekaM satsvabhAvatAkalpena mAnAbhAvAt.h, anugata-vyavahAra-abhAva-prasaN^gAchcha |

The understanding of sat (existence) as encompassing everything and everywhere is established by One (principle). (But) each and every thing in the world cannot be proved to be comprehended as (pure) existence in the same way as Brahman. And a contingency would arise due to the lack of a comprehensive system (of understanding, explaining, and discussing a large number of things and topics.) (Therefore, the claim that we would be committing the fallacy of arthAntara is not correct.)

MadhusUdana is making a crucial point here regarding what is technically called anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. When a property occurs in a number of different things, the naiyAyika would search for a common term or common concept to represent this common property and then refer to each of those things as possessing that common property. For example, if a pot is blue, a lotus is blue, and a cloth is blue, the naiyAyika would make "blue-ness" a common property and say that the pot possesses "blue-ness", the lotus possesses "blue-ness", and so on. Such a system wherein a number of things are explained using fewer concepts is said to have the advantage of "lAghava" or light-ness as compared to a system where a greater number of concepts are required, in which case a defect of "gaurava" or heaviness is said to prevail. This is directly related to the principle of "Occam's razor" as used in the West.

If I can explain a certain number of things using some hypotheses and you can explain the same things using fewer hypotheses than mine, then your explanation is better than mine. In keeping with the principle of "lAghava" or lightness rather than heaviness, the naiyAyika-logician is always looking for anugata dharma's or common properties to explain things. In the case at hand, the opponent says that just as Brahman is by Its very nature existence, the duality in the world is also similarly by its very nature existence and hence real.

MadhusUdana points out two problems with this claim: 1) There is no comprehension of the existence of individual things in the world as Brahman is. One does not get the idea "this pot that I see now is eternally existent and is never sublated." 2) If the reality of each and every thing in the world is admitted, then it would take a significant number of "real" entities to explain what is meant by "reality." This theory would be too heavy, suffer from the defect of "gaurava" because of the lack of a common property or anugata dharma. An explanation using a single non-dual Reality is superior even from this strictly logical viewpoint.

In the previous part of the series, we have seen how MadhusUdana refutes the charge of arthAntara, ie. proving something other than what he intended to. Next, MadhusUdana shows how mithyAtva can be redefined so that the opponent cannot even dream (no pun intended!) of making the charge of arthAntara. MadhusUdana alternatively defines mithyAtva as the absolute difference from sattva and the absolute difference from asattva. It must be noted that this alternative definition is not a new definition; it is entirely equivalent to the one accepted so far, ie. the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva.

The alternate definition makes use of mutual absence or anyonya-abhAva as opposed to atyanta-abhAva in the first definition.

MadhusUdana:
satpratiyogika-asatpratiyogikabhedadvayaM vA sAdhyam.h | tathAcha ubhayAtmakatve .anyatarAtmakatve vA, tAdR^igbheda-asaMbhavena tAbhyAmarthAntara-anavakAshaH |

Alternatively, (we may define) the sAdhya (the unreality of duality, mithyAtva) to be the difference that has existence as its counter- positive AND the difference that nonexistence as its counter-positive. (Simply put, mithyAtva is that which is different from existence AND different from nonexistence as well.) And there is no scope for (charging us with) arthAntara due to this because such difference from both (existence and nonexistence) or difference from one of them is not possible (according to our other opponents- the logicians, the Buddhists, and the view of VAchaspati Mishra in the nyAyavArttikatAtparyaTIkA).

No aMshataH siddhasAdhana (no partially redundant proof)

MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda. MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva. The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or non-existence.

MadhusUdana refuted these objections. He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva, namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving something other than what is intended).

The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two, say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real.

So the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference from nonexistence is redundant. But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence. Why?

Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sAdhya.)

Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana:
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That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 11:03 PM.
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  #7  
Old 03 April 2010, 11:36 AM
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Reputation: 12303
Re: Advaita Siddhi

Advaita Siddhi text contd.

Text: nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h |
"guNAdikaM guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhikR^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge tArkikAdyaN^gIkR^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddher- yathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvA- nna siddha-sAdhanam.h |
yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH kuMbha iti sAmAnAdhi- karaNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR^ite .api sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayojakatayA militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h |

Translation: (And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana (aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND non-different from each other. In arguing with the tArkikas (the naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference (of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas) say: "the quality and its possessor are different and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be related by a relation of non-difference." (So, they say,) there is no siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved.

Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved) is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva). So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning).

(You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say, no!)

In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established. (This is your stand.) Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent thing that lacks existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva and difference from asattva) is a prayojaka (a necessary factor) for dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing of that CONJUNCTION is what is intended.
__________________
That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 11:07 PM.
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  #8  
Old 03 April 2010, 11:42 AM
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Reputation: 12303
Re: Advaita Siddhi

The Second Definition of Unreality

The Second Definition
Continuing with the series on the advaita-siddhi, we will next study the second definition of mithyAtva that is defended by MadhusUdana SarasvatI. It is especially useful to be familiar with basic nyAya terminology as explained in the third and fourth parts of the series. Without such familiarity, the discussion below may not make much sense at all!

advaita-siddhi text:
pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |

Alternatively, mithyAtva (unreality) of something is that which is the counter-positive or absential adjunct (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation (a negation for all three periods of time, past, present, and future) in the very substratum where it (the thing) is cognized.

This is the second definition of mithyAtva that is taken up by MadhusUdana in his defense of mithyAtva of dvaita. This alternative definition is based on shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana", as BrahmAnanda says in his gauDabrahmAnandI, "neha nAnAstI"tyAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha". The second definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya, PrakAshAtman, the author of the PanchapAdikA-vivaraNa.

It is important to understand this definition and the significance of the terms involved. As in the case of the first definition of mithyAtva, what is alIka or a fictitious entity is NOT the mithyAtva that is used to describe the world. The mithyAtva of the world is akin to the illusion of the snake over a rope or silver in nacre. Upon realizing that the snake is illusory, one exclaims "The snake is unreal. The snake was never there to begin with, it is not there now, and it will never be there in the future!" This is the mithyAtva (unreality) of the world that is being talked about.

One important point to remember is that the in order for a thing to be mithyA or unreal according to this definition, it MUST be cognized or perceived in some susbtratum. This is a necessary condition for something to be called mithyA. What is perceived is called mithyA. That which can never be perceived, a chimera such as the horns of a hare, is NOT being called mithyA. Rather it is asat. And Brahman is sat.

MithyAtva is different from these two, ie. mithyAtva is sadasadvilaxaNa.

The first definition of mithyAtva is refined by the second definition. All that the first definition really says is that mithyA is something that is different from the absolutely real Brahman and from a fictitious entity. As per the first definition, the thing that is mithyA should be 1) cognized in some locus (substratum) and 2) be sublated (negated) at some time.

The second definition refines the first by saying that the thing that is mithyA is 1) sublated in the very locus where it is cognized and 2) and it is sublated so for ALL times.

Objections to the second definition
The objection of the opponent is based on the acceptance by advaitins of three orders of reality as defined in, for example, the Vedaanta

paribhaashhaa of dharmaraaja adhvarin: yadvaa trividhaM sattvaM -- paaramaarthikasattvaM brahmaNaH, vyaavahaarikaM sattvamaakaashaadeH, praatibhaasikaM sattvaM shuktirajataadeH |

The absolute reality of Brahman is paaramaarthika satya, the empirical reality of the objective world, which includes space etc., is vyaavahaarika satya, and the illusory appearance of silver in nacre (oyster-shell), etc. is praatibhaasika satya.

The Objection in brief: The objection by the opponent is aimed to trap the advaitin in an unrecoverable position by pointing out defects in any assignment of ontological status to the negation (sublation) used in the second definition of the mithyAtva.

advaita-siddhi text:
nanu, pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhasya tAttvikatve advaita- hAniH prAtibhAsikatve siddha-sAdhanaM, vyAvahArikatve .api tasya bAdhyatvena tAttvikasattvAvirodhitayA arthAntaraM, advaitashruter- atattvAvedakatvaM cha tatpratiyoginaH prAtibhAsikasya prapaJNchasya pAramArthikatvaM cha syAt.h,

Translation: Objection by the opponent: Now, if the absolute negation (of a thing, such as the world, that is being called mithyA as per the second definition) is absolutely real (pAramArthika), then the basic principle of advaita (non-dualism) is destroyed! (If the absolute negation) is only illusory (prAtibhAsika), then you are proving what is already established (ie. the reality of the world). Even (if the absolute negation) is empirical (vyAvahArika), you will be proving something other than what you intended because (such negation) will not be opposed to the absolute reality (of the world). The shruti texts that are non-dualistic will be incapable of revealing the truth. And (if it be claimed that) the world is illusory, (that will not hold) and (the world) would have absolute reality (pAramAthikatva).

Let us examine the opponent's objection in a little more detail. The opponent says: You define three orders of reality - pAramArthika, vyAvahArika, and prAtibhAsika. And you have defined mithyAtva as the counter-positive-ness of the absolute negation (for all periods of time) in the very substratum where the thing that is mithyA is cognized. In essence, you would like to categorize the world as mithyA.

Now, what reality do you assign to such a negation of the world? 1) Is this negation pAramArthika (absolutely real)? 2) Is this negation prAtibhAsika (illusory) ? 3) Or, is this negation vyAvahArika (empirical) ? Regardless of the type of reality you assign to this negation, you run into problems.

1) The negation of the world is pAramArthika. In this case, you have a direct contradiction with the non-dual principle of advaita.
BrahmAnanda explains the objection: advaita-hAniH "neha nAne"tyAdishrutibodhitasya brahmaNi dR^ishya- sAmAnyAbhAvasya virodhaH

(There is) damage to the principle of non-duality as known from shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" (there is no manifold-ness here whatsoever) (because) of the contradiction due to the common absence of the "perceived" (dR^ishya). If the negation of the world is pAramArthika, then you have two such realities - 1) Brahman, and 2) the said negation of the world. This compromises the non-duality principle.

2) The negation of the world is prAtibhAsika, illusory. In this case, you have siddha-sAdhana-doshha.

BrahmAnanda explains:
siddha-sAdhanamiti |
kapAle ghaTo nAstItyAdibhrame prAtItikasya- atyantAbhAvasya vishhayatvena siddha-sAdhanamityarthaH |

siddha-sAdhana means that in cases of erroneous cognition or illusion such as denying the pot in its parts, the absolute absence of the (erroneously) cognized negation is already established (in another system). In other words, if you say the negation is illusory, such as the negation of a pot in its two halves, such a position is already admitted by another system. (A whole is said "inhere" in its parts as per nyAya. So a whole, such as a pot, cannot be denied in its parts. Any such denial is erroneous.) In other words, if you say the negation of the world is illusory or erroneous, that is already admitted by the realist schools. So you are committing the mistake of siddha-sAdhana.

3)The negation of the world is vyAvahArika. In this case, what you are saying is that the negation of the world will itself get sublated upon realization of Brahman. What does this mean? The world itself CANNOT be vyAvahArika because it is absurd (a contradiction) to say that the world as well as its negation get sublated upon Brahman realization. Either the world or its negation can get sublated at the same time but not both! Therefore, you are left with two possibilities – (a). the world is pAramArthika or absolutely real OR (b). the world is prAtibhAsika or illusory. But you deny the world is illusory, and so the world can only be pAramArthika.

This point is stated by BrahmAnanda as:

prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena pAramArthikatvameva balAtsyAditi bhAvaH |

(Since the world) cannot possibly be illusory it is forced to be absolutely real (pAramArthika) only. This is the purport (of the opponent).

Again, ViTThalesha explains why the world cannot be illusory when he comments on the term "prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena" of BrahmAnanda:

brahmaGYAnAnyAbAdhyatvAditi (The world cannot be illusory) because (it is admitted by the advaitin) to remain un-sublated (not negated) by anything other than knowledge of Brahman. So what is the result of accepting the world as pAramArthika and the negation of the world as vyAvahArika? These are the defects. First, you will have established the world as absolutely real which is different from what you set out to prove. This is the defect of arthAntara. Second, the shruti texts that speak of non-duality such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" will have to be accepted as NOT revealing the ultimate truth because they can only reveal what is empirical ( vyAvahArika), ie. the negation of the world.

In response to the objection of the opponent, MadhusUdana now begins his reply:

iti chet.h? na |

If this is what you say, we say no!
__________________
That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 11:11 PM.
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  #9  
Old 03 April 2010, 11:44 AM
atanu atanu is offline
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Reputation: 12303
Re: Advaita Siddhi

MadhusUdana's reply to the objection to the Second Definition

To understand MadhusUdana's reply to the objection (advaita-siddhi 12), we need to find out what it means to negate something in the world.

Shankara states in his commentary on gItA 2.16:
sarvatra buddhidvayopalabdheH, sadbuddhiH asadbuddhiH iti |
yadvishhayA buddhiH na vyabhicharati tat.h sat.h, yadvishhayA vyabhicharati tat.h asat.h|

There are two cognitions everywhere (in any cognition in the world) - cognition of the real and cognition of the unreal. That cognition which does not change is real (sat) and that which changes is unreal (mithyA). [Please note that Shankara's usage of asat corresponds to mithyA.]

In the cognition, "the pot is" (san.h ghaTaH), the permanent factor is " is" which indicates the underlying existence. What is an illusion is "the pot". What is cognized is just this permanent factor but it is falsely understood to be a pot by the super-imposition (adhyAsa) of the name-and-form on the underlying Existence (sat).

In another cognition, "the cloth is" (san.h paTaH), again the common, permanent factor is "is." What is an illusion has to do with "the cloth." In other words, between the cognitions "the pot is", and "the cloth is", what is common, constant, and permanent is the factor, "is."

What we see above is a cognition where the cognizer gives a name to a cognized object, such as a pot, cloth etc. Another type of cognition tries to assert an adjective or attribute of an object. In the cognition, "the blue pot is", again what is common, constant, and permanent is the factor "is." What is illusion is "the blue pot." So what is being denied ultimate reality is the "blueness" and "potness" of the object but not pure existence indicated by "is".

Generalizing this to all cognitions, all objects are real as far as they are treated as pure existence, but the moment you start associating them with names and forms, the illusion begins. This Existence is the common, unchanging, and permanent factor among all cognitions.
Therefore, status of anything in the world may be said to be comprised of two components 1) a Real part and 2) an unreal part.

So every cognition is made of two parts - a real part, E and an unreal part, X. Shankara assures us that the real part E remains the same for all cognitions while the unreal part X changes. So we come to the interesting question: what does it mean to negate something in the world, such as a pot? It is clear that the real component of the pot, which is Existence, can NEVER be negated. However, the unreal name-and-form (nAma-rUpa) component of the pot can be negated. This means only one thing. The negation of the pot also has two components - 1) a real component, Existence (Being) and 2) an unreal component that negates only the unreal component, name-and-form (nAma-rUpa), of the pot.

This is essentially what MadhusUdana says. The negation of the world has two components. The real component (pAramArthika) is identical with Brahman (sat) and the unreal component is of the same order of reality as the world, ie. vyAvahArika. The unreal component of the negation only negates the unreal component of the world. We will first see how

MadhusUdana explains the real component of the negation.

advaita-siddhi text:
prapaJNchanishhedha-adhikaraNIbhUta-brahmAbhinnatvAnnishhedhasya tAtvikatve .api na-advaitahAnikaratvam.h |
na cha tAtvikAbhAva- pratiyoginaH prapaJNchasya tAtvikApattiH, tAtvikAbhAvapratiyogini shuktirajatAdau kalpite vyabhichArAt.h |

Translation: (If we hold that) the negation (of the world) is non-different from Brahman which is the substratum of the negation of the world, then there is no damage done to the non-duality principle. And the world as the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absolutely real (pAramArthika) negation cannot be (forced to be) absolutely real (based on an erroneous rule that the pratiyogin of a negation and the negation itself must necessarily belong to the same order of reality.) An exception (to this rule which proves the rule to be erroneous) is the silver-in-nacre that is (illusory only) and its negation (at the end of illusion) which is real.

To understand MadhusUdana's stand, we need to examine how negation or absence (abhAva) is treated in different systems. The questions are: 1) Is abhAva a category (padArtha) in itself? in other words, do we have a cognition of abhAva? 2) Through what means of cognition (pramANa) is abhAva cognized?

The bhATTa-mImAMsakas, for example, hold that abhAva is a separate category and it is cognized through a separate pramANa called anupalabdhi or non-apprehension. The naiyAyikas and MAdhvas hold that abhAva is a separate category but they do not recognize a separate pramANa like anupalabdhi for it, and hold that abhAva can be known through standard pramANas such as perception, inference, and verbal testimony. The prAbhAkara-mImAMsakas hold that abhAva is not a category in itself, nor is there a pramANa such as anupalabdhi.
For example, consider the sentence "there is no pot on the ground", - bhUtale ghaTo nAsti.

Here, an absence or negation of a pot is being asserted with respect to the ground, the substratum. The bhATTas, naiyAyikas, and MAdhvas all accept that the absence of pot on the ground is cognized as separate from the ground. But the prAbhAkara-mImAMsakas hold that the absence of the pot is really identical to the ground, the substratum itself. One of the greatest prAbhAkara mImAMsakas, shAlikanAtha defines abhAva in the

prakaraNa-paJNchikA :
dR^ishye pratiyogini yA tadekavishhayA buddhiH sA tadabhAvo vyapadishyate |

(prakaraNapaJNchikA) abhAva (negation or absence) is the cognition of the (substratum) alone while the pratiyogin (the thing that is negated) is supposed to have been perceived (had it been present).

When we say "there is no pot on the ground", we are really only saying that we perceive the ground alone where a pot was supposed to have been present. We do not perceive such a thing as "absence of pot" on the ground. Therefore, "absence of pot" is the same as the ground alone, the substratum. Here the pot which is supposed to have been present but not seen is the pratiyogin.

Earlier, it was stated that the negation of the world has two components - 1) a real component, Existence (sat) and 2) an unreal component that is the negation of the name-and-form aspects of the world. The real component can be identified with Brahman, the substratum, and agrees with the PrAbhAkara mImAMsA view of negation that equates the negation with the substratum. As to the objection that the negation and the thing negated must both belong to the same order of reality, MadhusUdana says this rule is flawed because there is an exception. In the illusion of silver in nacre, the silver is illusory (prAtibhAsika) but the negation of the silver (at the end of the illusion) is real or vyAvahArika at best which is of a different order of reality.

The unreal component of the negation, which is vyAvahArika, is discussed next by MadhusUdana.
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That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

Last edited by atanu : 03 April 2010 at 12:15 PM.
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Old 03 April 2010, 11:47 AM
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Re: Advaita Siddhi

prapaJNchaniShedha (negation of the world) can also be vyAvahArika

BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedha-pratiyogitvam.h" (please see advaita-siddhi 10). Unreality is that which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the substratum where it is cognized.

So the opponent asks: Now, how do you classify this absolute negation that you speak of? Is this absolute negation pAramArthika, vyAvahArika or prAtibhAsika? We have seen how MadhusUdana has answered this question by pointing out that the absolute negation can be treated as pAramArthika, identical with Brahman. In doing so, there is no harm done to the non-duality principle. Also, the opponent cannot insist on the rule that a negation and its counter-positive (pratiyogin)have to have the same order of reality (sama-sattAka), because an exception that breaks the rule is readily found in the case of an illusion such as the silver-in-nacre illusion. The illusory silver is prAtibhAsika but its negation is pAramArthika if the substratum of illusion is treated as Brahman Itself or at least vyAvahArika, ifthe substratum is taken to be nacre.
Having shown how the negation can be pAramArthika, MadhusUdana now shows how the negation may also be treated as vyAvahArika. This corresponds to the unreal part of the negation.The basis of this approach to analyzing the negation is found in such treatises as the dR^ig-dR^ishya-viveka which says:

asti bhAti priyaM rUpaM nAma chetyaMshapaJNchakam.h |
AdyatrayaM brahmarUpaM jagadrUpaM tato dvayam.h || 20 ||

Everything has five factors: 1) Existence, 2) Consciousness 3) Bliss, 4) Name, and 5) Form. Of these, the first three are of the nature of Brahman and the last two (Name and Form) belong to the world.

khaMvAyvagnijalorvIshhu devatiryaN^.h narAdishhu |
abhinnAssachchidAnandAH bhidyete rUpanAmanI || 21 ||

In the elements, space, air, fire, water, and earth, in Gods, animals, and humans, (and other things in the world) what is non-different (constant, unchanging) are Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss. What are different (among all these things) are the Name and Form aspects.

[The first verse above also occurs in the sarasvatI-rahasya-upanishhad.]

When the world is negated, the sachchidAnanda aspect, which is un-negatable, remains. The nAma-rUpa aspects are negated. These were never real to begin with. A rough analogy, that has its own limitations, may be given to illustratethe two aspects of negation. Suppose we see a pot on the ground. Then the pot is removed. For a while after the pot has been removed, we "feel" the absence of the pot, although we continue to perceive the ground. During this phase, we perceive, in some sense, the absence of the pot, as well as the ground. Subsequently, we forget all about the pot. At this point, we are only aware of the ground, not the pot or its absence. Both the pot and its absence have been forgotten. There is no memory of either having existed.

In such a case, where the negation is cognized as different from the substratum, the negation can be taken to be the same order of reality as the thing that is negated, the pratiyogin. This is what MadhusUdana says next.

advaita-siddhi text:
atAtvika eva vA nishhedho .ayam.h | atAtvikatve .api na prAtibhAsikaH,
kiMtu vyAvahArikaH| nacha - tarhi nishhedhasya bAdhyatvena tAtvikasattva-
avirodhitvAdarthAntaram-iti vAchyam.h | svApnArthasya svApnanishhedhena
bAdhadarshanAt.h | nishhedhasya bAdhyatvaM pAramArthikasattva-avirodhitve
na tantram.h, kiMtu nishhedhyApexayA nyUnasattAkatvam.h | prakR^ite cha
tulyasattAkatvAt.h kathaM na virodhitvam.h |

Meaning:
Or we may say that this negation (of the world) is unreal. Even though it is unreal, it is not illusory (prAtibhAsika), but empirical (vyAvahArika). And (you) cannot say:"Since the negation, that is itself sublatable, cannot be in opposition to the reality (of the world), there is the defect of proving something other than intended." (Why?) Because, of the instance of sublation of a dream-object along with its dream-negation. There is nodependence or implication of the non-opposition to absolute reality on the sublatability of the negation, but on the negation's being of a lower order of reality than the thing that is negated. In the present case, there is equality of the order of reality (of the negation and the thing that is negated, ie. the world). So how is there no opposition (to the reality of the world)?

MadhusUdana says here that the negation of the world can be viewed as vyAvahArika.
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