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    Advaita Siddhi

    Namaste friends

    It has been felt that we have not seen the scholarly exposition of Advaita theories. So, let us take up Madhusudan Saraswati’s Advaita Siddhi for discussion.

    I have taken full of this discussion from Shri Anand Hudli's (whom I don't know but have come to admire) excellent text and just formatted the pieces to make them suitable for pasting in this thread. Anyone interested to study the full text immediately may do so at http://www.advaitasiddhi.org/. I thank Anand, for his excellent effort. I also hope that this thread in HDF will also serve us well.

    Madhusudan Saraswati does not seem to be a mere sadhu but a sadhu with a brilliant logician’s mind that can destroy any mithyAtva. In his best known work, called Advaita Siddhi, Madhusudan defined mithyAtva with three definitions that answer all possible Dvaita and Vishistaadvaita logical oppositions.

    The first definition of mithyAtva says that what is mithyA is characterized by "sadasadanadhikaraNatva", not being the substratum of either sat (Existence) or asat (nonexistence).

    The second definition of mithyAtva says that what is mithyA (unreal) is characterized as being the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation (asat) in the very substratum where it (the thing that is mithyA) is cognized.

    The third definition in the advaita-siddhi simply says: YAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |, Unreality is the property of being sublated by knowledge or cognition.


    Note: pratiyogin an adversary , rival ; any object dependent upon another and not existing without it ; a partner , associate ; a counterpart , match .
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 09:20 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    ADVAITASIDDHI
    Madhusudana Sarasvati
    Introduction
    ||shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
    || shrIviTThalaM namAmi ||

    The advaita-siddhi is regarded as one of the most important polemical works of advaita. It is MadhusUdana sarasvatI's brilliant and successful defense of advaita in response to the objections of the MAdhvas, the dualists. Shankara states that his doctrine of brahmajnAna (brahmajnAnamapi vastutantrameva - brahma-sUtra- bhAshhya 1.1.2) is a "vastu-tantra", a doctrine based on facts, as opposed to a "purushha-tantra", a doctrine based on the knowledge of an individual. One can raise objections against individual opinions but facts cannot be objected to; they can possibly be misunderstood. One can possibly express ignorance of facts but not argue against them. So one may ask: how is it possible for the mAdhvas to raise objections against advaita that is based on facts? It is not possible. What the MAdhvas, the dvaitins, have done is to express misunderstandings, not objections.

    It is, therefore, proper to answer the so-called objections of the mAdhvas by clearing their misunderstandings of advaita. But it must also be mentioned that, in some cases at least, it appears that the misunderstandings are not genuine misunderstandings but misunderstandings introduced on purpose to A) misrepresent advaita first and then, B) to try to refute the resulting misrepresentation. Nevertheless, advaitins should remove all misunderstandings, whether they be genuine or otherwise, and no advaitin has done this better than MadhusUdana SarasvatI, the great logician from Bengal.


    I endeavor here to present some glimpses of the advaita-siddhi's great treasures, treasures that are to be cherished for all time. In a forum like this one, it is hard, if not impossible, to do justice to such a monumental work as the advaita-siddhi. So I will endeavor to present only a few discussions with translation, consulting the explanations of Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya in his advaita-siddhi-vyAkhyA, of BrahmAnanda in his GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghuchandrikA) commentary on the advaita-siddhi, and of ViTThala upAdhyAya in his commentary on the laghu-chandrikA. All these works, namely the advaita-siddhi, siddhi-vyAkhyA, GauDa-brahmAnandI, and also the viTThaleshopAdhyAyI commentary on the GauDa-brahmA-nandI, all in the original Sanskrit, have been edited by Pandit Anantakrishna Sastri and published by Parimal Publications, Delhi,in 1988.

    A few words about the authors. MadhusUdana sarasvatI is a towering giant among advaitins. An oft quoted verse regarding him is:

    madhusUdanasarasvatyAH pAraM vetti sarasvatI |
    pAraM vetti sarasvatyAH madhusUdanasarasvatI ||

    (Only) the Goddess of Learning, sarasvatI knows the limits of(knowledge of) MadhusUdana sarasvatI. And MadhusUdana sarasvatI knows the limits of (knowledge of) Goddess sarasvatI!

    He is said to have had three illustrious gurus. He learned mImAMsA from mAdhava sarasvatI, vedAnta from rAmatIrtha, and took sannyAsa dIxA from vishveshvara sarasvatI. Apart from the advaita-siddhi which is MadhusUdana's "crest-jewel", he is said to have written numerous other works, including a lucid commentary on the gItA called gUDhArtha-dIpikA, and a work called "advaita-ratna-laxana", a refutation of the work "bheda-ratna" by the logician shankara mishra.

    MadhusUdana demonstrates his ability as a master logician in the advaita-siddhi, which he wrote as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita of the mAdhva exponent, vyAsatIrtha. MadhusUdana was so accomplished in navya-nyAya (logic) techniques that the following verse is quoted about him when he visited navadvIpa, the center for learning in nyAya-shAstra.

    navadvIpe samAyAte madhusUdanavAkpatau chakampe tarkavAgIshaH kAtaro .abhUd.h gadAdharaH ||

    When MadhusUdana, the master of speech, came to navadvIpa, MathurAnAtha tarkavAgIsha (who was the foremost navya naiyAyika during those times) trembled (with fear) and GadAdhara (another logician of great repute) became afraid.

    Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya, the author of siddhi-vyAkhyA, is said to have a been a favorite student of MadhusUdana. BrahmAnanda, the author of gauDabrahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA), wrote the work as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita-taraN^giNI of the dvaitin (dualist) rAmAchArya. BrahmAnanda was the student of nArAyaNa tIrtha, a student of MadhusUdana. Finally, ViTThalesha upAdhyAya, a brAhmaNa of the Konkan region, has also placed the followers of advaita under his debt for writing a lucid commentary on the gaUDa-brahmAnandI.
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 08:33 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    The First Definition of Unreality
    || shrIvishhNave namaH ||

    Verse 1 of the advaita-siddhi
    mAyAkalpita-mAtR^itA-mukha-mR^ishhA-dvaitaprapaJNchAshrayaH satya-GYAna-sukhAtmakaH shruti-shikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharaH |
    mithyA-bandha-vidhUnanena paramAnandaika-tAnAtmakaM mokshhaM prApta iva svayaM vijayate vishhNur-vikalporjjhitaH ||1 ||


    Translation based on siddhivyAkhyA of Balabhadra bhaTTAchArya and GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA) of BrahmAnanda
    VishhNu shines supreme, He who is the substratum (basis) of the world of duality beginning with the notion of cognizer (mAtR^i),of duality that is false and fabricated by mAyA, He whose nature is Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss, He who is realized by the undifferentiated (undivided) direct experience arising from the mahAvAkyas of vedAnta, He who by shaking off the false bonds (of mAyA) has attained, as it were, mokshha wholly consisting of supreme bliss, and He who becomes free from all variety, manifoldness (vikalpa). (1)

    Review of navya nyAya concepts

    A review of some concepts and terms from nyAya is in order before we proceed further. Please see "Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic" by Ingalls or "The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation" by Bimal Krishna Matilal for more details.

    Process of inference: Every noneternal entity, according to nyAya, must be a result of an instrumental cause (karaNa) and an operation (vyApAra). An inference (anumAna), that is a means to knowledge of man and hence noneternal, must have an instrumental cause and an operation by which the cause brings about the inference. In the process of inference, the operation is called parAmarsha or consideration, and the instrumental cause is the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyApti), also called pervasion. This vyApti corresponds very roughly to logical implication in Western logic. In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the instrumental cause, karaNa is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance, "smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire", vahni-vyApyo dhUmaH, ie. where there is smoke there is fire.

    The operation, vyApAra is the consideration (parAmarsha) that is knowledge of the occurrence of the concomitant in the subject (pakshha) where the inference is being made. In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the parAmarsha will be of the form, "the mountain possesses smoke which is an invariable concomitant of fire" - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h In polemical treatises and debates, an inference is stated tersely by listing the inference (conclusion) followed by a single word representing the application of the consideration and the invariable concomitance. For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain possesses fire because of smoke." In every inference, there are evident three terms, called 1) sAdhya or that which is to be proved, 2) the hetu or linga, the concomitant, and 3) the subject or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur. In the inference, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke", the sAdhya is vahni (fire), the hetu is smoke, and the pakshha is parvata (mountain).

    In the standard form of inference, the three terms are placed as follows: pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-suffix hetu-in-ablative-case For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke." The definition of vyApti is very important. It is defined by the bhAshhA-parichchheda (of VishvanAtha) as: vyAptiH sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaMbandha udAhR^itaH | Invariable concomitance is said to be the absence of relation of the (hetu) to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya. Here the relation should be the same as the relation under consideration for the vyApti. As per this definition of vyApti, smoke is an invariable concomitant of fire (or smoke is "pervaded" by fire) because it is not the case that there is something that has smoke but not fire. However, fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke.
    There are things such as a red-hot iron rod that has fire but no smoke. So fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke. A relation between two entities is often explained as the superimposition of one entity on the other. Here, the entity that is superimposed is called the superstratum or Adheya. The entity on which the Adheya is superimposed is called substratum or locus. Sanskrit names for "substratum" is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa.

    In the example, bhUtale ghaTo vartate, "there is a pot on the ground", the superstratum is the pot (ghaTa), the ground (bhUtalam.h) is the substratum or locus, and the relation is "contact", saMyoga. Another way of looking at relations (saMbandha) is to differentiate between what Ingalls calls "occurrence-exacting" and "non occurrence exacting" relations. Relations such as inherence (samavAya) are always occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the relation between a whole and its parts, a genus or class (jAti) and a particular instance of the class, etc. Contact (saMyoga) can sometimes be occurrence exacting but sometimes not. In relation between two entities, one of the entities is an adjunct or pratiyogin, and the other is a subjunct or anuyogin.

    If a relation is such that one entity is a locus or substratum (AdhAra) of the other which must be the superstratum (Adheya), then the AdhAra is the subjunct or anuyogin. The Adheya is the adjunct or pratiyogin. In the example, bhUtale ghaTaH, "there is a pot on the ground", ghaTa is the pratiyogin while bhUtalam.h is the anuyogin. Two types of absences (abhAva) are distinguished in navya-nyAya. One is called anyonya-abhAva that is essentially a denial of identity between to entities. The other is saMsarga-abhAva or relational absence. Here, there are three kinds: 1) prAgabhAva, the absence of a thing before it is brought into being, 2) dhvamsAbhAva, the absence of a thing after it is destroyed, and 3) atyanta-abhAva, eternal absence. The terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are also used in the context of absences. When we say "bhUtale ghaTo nAsti", "there is no pot on the ground", the pratiyogin of the absence is "ghaTa", pot, and the anuyogin is "bhUtalam.h", ground. The pratiyogin of this type should be called "abhAvIya-pratiyogin" to distinguish it from the relational adjunct, but naiyAyikas often write "pratiyogin" for both relational and absential adjuncts.

    Some of the properties that are commonly used in naiyAyika literature are those that correspond to the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa (locus), vishhayin (knowledge), vishhaya (content of knowledge), visheshhya (qualificand), visheshhaNa (qualifier), prakAra (chief qualifier), etc. The abstract properties or relational abstracts of these are formed by simply adding the suffix, "tva" or "tA" to each term. For example, one may write sAdhyatva to mean "the property of being a sAdhya" or "sAdhya-ness", hetutva or "the property of being a hetu" or "hetu-ness", etc.
    A sentence of the form, parvato vahnimAn.h, "the mountain (parvata) has fire (vahni)", can be first rewritten as parvato vahnyadhikaraNam.h, "the mountain is a locus or substratum of fire". This is then analyzed by the naiyAyika as follows: parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA | The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by vahni. Or parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishhThAdheyatA nirUpitA | The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by the AdheyatA (superstratum-ness) resident in fire. The most characteristic terms of navya-nyAya are "avachchhedaka" (limitor) and "avachchhinna" (limited). These terms are used in the context of relational abstracts or abstract properties. An entity, such as a pot (ghaTa), is said to be qualified by a qualifier, but a relational abstract is said to be limited by a limitor.
    Let us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, "the mountain has fire." Here, the mountain is a substratum (adhikaraNa) of fire which is the superstratum (Adheya). The adhikaraNatA in parvata is described by vahni (fire), but this adhikaraNatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by parvatatva. Similarly, the AdheyatA in vahni (fire) is said to be described by parvata but this AdheyatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by vahnitva or fire-ness. So a navya-naiyAyika would write:
    parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatva- avachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishhThAdheyatA sA parvata-nirUpita-vahnitva-avachchhinnAdheyatA |

    The adhikaraNatA in mountain is described by fire and limited by parvatatva (mountain-ness), and the AdheyatA in fire is described by mountain and limited by vahnitva (fire-ness). A generic relational abstract may also be limited. In the sentence, "a stick is the instrumental cause of a pot", daNDo nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with respect to a specific pot and stick. The assertion is generally about all sticks and pots. So the naiyAyika writes: daNDatvaM ghaTa-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h | Stick-ness is the limitor of instrumental-cause-ness described by pot.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    The first definition of mithyAtva - objections

    Earlier, MadhusUdana set forth the objective of establishing the unreality (mithyAtva) of duality (dvaita), or in other words the unreality of the world (jaganmithyAtva). After a brief digression of navya-nyAya, we will now look at the first definition of mithyAtva (unreality) that comes under attack from the mAdhva opponent. This definition is the one given by PadmapAdAchArya in his PanchapAdikA.

    advaita-siddhi --------------- atha

    prathamamithyAtva-vichAraH | The opponent criticizes the definition of mithyAtva as follows:
    nanu kimidaM mithyAtvaM sAdhyate, na tAvat.h "mithyAshabdo- anirvachanIyatAvachana" iti panchapAdikAvachanAt.h sadasad- anadhikaraNatvarUpamanirvAchyatvam.h, taddhi kiM asatva- vishishhTa-sattvAbhAvaH, uta sattvAtyantAbhAva-asattva-atyanta- abhAvarUpaM dharmadvayam.h, Ahosvit.h sattvAtyanta-abhAvavatve sati asattva-atyanta-abhAvarUpaM vishishhTam.h |

    Now, what is this unreality (mithyAtva) that (you) want to infer (as characterizing the world)? This unreality is by no means non-definability as defined by the statement of the panchapAdikA that the word mithyA (unreal) is denoted by non-definability, the non-definability being of the nature of NOT being the substratum (adhikaraNa) of either existence or non-existence. What is "not being the substratum of existence or non-existence"?

    Is it 1) the absence of existence qualified by non-existence or 2) the pair of attributes of (a). absolute absence of existence and (b). absolute absence of non-existence, or 3) the property of the absolute absence of nonexistence during the absolute absence of existence, ie. being a common substratum of the attributes - the absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of non-existence?

    nAdyaH, sattvamAtrAdhAre jagatyasattvavishishhTasattva-anabhyu- pagamAt, vishishhTa-abhAva-sAdhane siddha-sAdhanAt.h |

    (You) cannot (claim) the first (regarding the world) because the world is the substratum of only existence (sattva) and existence qualified by non-existence is not admitted. And by proving the absence of existence as qualified by non-existence, (you commit the flaw of) proving what is already established (siddha-sAdhana).

    na dvitIyaH, sattva-asattvayorekAbhAve aparasattva-avashyakatvena vyAghAtAt.h, nirdharmakabrahmavatsattva-asattva-rAhitye .api sadrUpatvena amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntarAchcha, shuktirUpye abAdhyatvarUpasattva-vyatirekasya sattvena bAdhyatvarUpa-asattvasya vyatireka-asiddhyA sAdhyavaikalyAchcha |

    (You) cannot (claim) the second. Because, wherever there is an absence of one of existence and nonexistence, there the presence of the other is necessary; this leads to a contradiction. (Also), the world, just like the Brahman without attributes, even being without the attributes, existence and nonexistence, by (its very) nature of existence, is established as NOT unreal; this would lead to (the defect of) arthAntara, proving something other than what is to be proved.

    In the silver-in-nacre (example of illusion that is often quoted by advaitins to show the ontological status of the world), (we grant that) it (silver-nacre) is without existence whose nature is non-sublatability (noncontradicted-ness), (but) the absence of nonexistence, whose nature is sublatibility (contradicted-ness), is NOT established; this leads to the defectiveness of (your) sAdhya, what (you) seek to prove.
    ata eva na tR^itIyaH, pUrvavadvyAghAtAt.h, arthAntarAtsAdhya- vaikalyAchcha

    For the very same reason(s) as before, the third (alternative in defining mithyAtva, ie. the common substratum of the attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence) cannot (be claimed) because of the fallacies of contradiction (violation of the law of the excluded middle), proving something other than what is intended, and defectiveness of the sAdhya.

    MadhusUdana now begins his reply thus:

    iti chet.h, maivam.h
    If this is what you say, it is unjustified.
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 12:05 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    MadhusUdana's reply

    Brief recap: We have seen that mithyAtva (unreality) can be defined as anirvachanIyatva (property of not being definable), and this anirvachanIyatva can further be explained as sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or nonexistence. The opponent lists three ways in which this sadasadanadhikaraNatva may be defined. He finds fault with each of these definitions. MadhusUdana disagrees and starts his counter-argument.

    MadhusUdana's reply:
    sattva-atyanta-abhAva-asattva-atyanta-abhAva-rUpa-dharma- dvaya-vivaxAyAM doshhAbhAvAt.h | nacha vyAhatiH |

    In the intended meaning of "sadasad-anadhikaraNa" (not being the substratum of existence or nonexistence) as "the pair of attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence", there is NO defect. There is NO contradiction too. (Why?)

    sA hi sattvAsattvayoH parasparaviraharUpatayA vA, paraspara- virahavyApakatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApyatayA vA |

    That (contradiction could result) only if 1) existence and nonexistence mutually negate each other or 2) they mutually pervade each other's absence (one's absence is the invariable concomitant of the other), or 3) they are mutually pervaded by each other's absence (one is the invariable concomitant of the other's absence). (PS: Recall the definition of vyApti in the third part of this series.)

    tatra nAdyaH, tadanaN^gIkArAt.h | tathAhyatra trikAlAbAdhyatva- sattva-vyatireko nAsattvam.h, kintu kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatva-anadhikaraNatvam.h | tadvyatirekashcha sAdhyatvena vivaxitaH |

    There is no (presence of the) first condition, because it is not accepted. It is so (not accepted) because the negation of existence, that is not sublatable at any time, past, present, or future, is NOT nonexistence, but (nonexistence means) NOT being cognized as existing in any substratum (at any time). The negation of that (nonexistence) is what is intended to be (part of) what is to be proved.

    tathAcha trikAlAbAdhyavilaxaNatve sati kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatvarUpaM sAdhyaM paryavasitam.h | evaMcha sati na shuktirUpye sAdhyavaikalyamapi | bAdhyatvarUpAsattvavyatirekasya sAdhyApraveshAt.h | nApi vyAghAtaH, parasparaviraharUpatva- abhAvAt.h |

    The conclusion to be established is that while being different from that which is never sublatable, it is (capable of) being cognized as existing in some substratum. And this being so, there is no defect of the sAdhya's (being absent) in silver-in-nacre. (This is) because the negation of nonexistence which is sublatable (always) does not form part of what is to be established (sAdhya). (What does form part of the sAdhya is the negation of nonexistence which consists in not being cognized in any locus or substratum at any time). (Therefore,) there is no contradiction too (here) because there is no mutual negation between (existence and nonexistence).

    ata eva na dvitIyo .api, sattvAbhAvavati shuktirUpye vivaxita- asattvavyatirekasya vidyamAnatvena vyabhichArAt.h |

    For this reason, the second condition (under which contradiction can occur) does not hold too. (There can be no invariable concomitance of the absence of existence or nonexistence with the other.) (The requirement for such concomitance to hold is not satisfied) due to deviation (vyabhichAra), since in (illusory things such as) the silver-in-nacre, there is the absence of existence, but the absence of the nonexistence with the intended definition (as above) is also cognized. (In order for the concomitance to hold, nonexistence would have to be present when existence is absent.)

    nApi tR^itIyaH tasya vyAghAta-aprayojakatvAt.h, gotva-ashvatvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayor-ushhTrAdAvekatra sahopalaMbhAt.h |

    The third condition does not cause contradiction. (For example,) cow-ness (the property of being a cow) and horse-ness (property of being a horse) are invariable concomitants of each other's absence (ie. where cow-ness is present, horse-ness is absent and where horse-ness is present, cow-ness is absent). Even so, the two properties (of cow-ness and horse-ness) are NOT present in the same locus such as a camel, etc., and (the absences of cow-ness and horse-ness are) perceived thus together (in the same locus).

    Balabhadra clarifies:

    tatashcha sattva-asattvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayorekatra prapaJNche saMbhavAnna vyAhatiriti dhyeyam.H|

    And therefore, even though existence and nonexistence are invariable concomitants of each other's absence, the absences of both CAN occur in the same place, ie. the world and due to (this) there is NO contradiction. This is to be thought of.
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 12:13 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    No arthAntara

    After rejecting the claim made by the opponent that the definitions of sadasadanadhikaraNatva are faulty, MadhusUdana next shows that the charge made regarding arthAntara is also not valid.

    MadhusUdana's reply (continued):

    yachcha - nirdharmakasya brahmaNaH sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavat- prapaJNchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- uktam.h| tanna |

    And the (opponent) said: Just as the attributeless Brahman lacks existence (as an attribute) but (Its) very nature is existence, the very nature of the world too is existence. This establishes that the world is not mithyA (unreal). By this (it follows that you will have) established something other (than what you wanted to) - arthAntara. (We say): It is not so.

    ekenaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau brahmavat.h prapaJNchasya pratyekaM satsvabhAvatAkalpena mAnAbhAvAt.h, anugata-vyavahAra-abhAva-prasaN^gAchcha |

    The understanding of sat (existence) as encompassing everything and everywhere is established by One (principle). (But) each and every thing in the world cannot be proved to be comprehended as (pure) existence in the same way as Brahman. And a contingency would arise due to the lack of a comprehensive system (of understanding, explaining, and discussing a large number of things and topics.) (Therefore, the claim that we would be committing the fallacy of arthAntara is not correct.)

    MadhusUdana is making a crucial point here regarding what is technically called anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. When a property occurs in a number of different things, the naiyAyika would search for a common term or common concept to represent this common property and then refer to each of those things as possessing that common property. For example, if a pot is blue, a lotus is blue, and a cloth is blue, the naiyAyika would make "blue-ness" a common property and say that the pot possesses "blue-ness", the lotus possesses "blue-ness", and so on. Such a system wherein a number of things are explained using fewer concepts is said to have the advantage of "lAghava" or light-ness as compared to a system where a greater number of concepts are required, in which case a defect of "gaurava" or heaviness is said to prevail. This is directly related to the principle of "Occam's razor" as used in the West.

    If I can explain a certain number of things using some hypotheses and you can explain the same things using fewer hypotheses than mine, then your explanation is better than mine. In keeping with the principle of "lAghava" or lightness rather than heaviness, the naiyAyika-logician is always looking for anugata dharma's or common properties to explain things. In the case at hand, the opponent says that just as Brahman is by Its very nature existence, the duality in the world is also similarly by its very nature existence and hence real.

    MadhusUdana points out two problems with this claim: 1) There is no comprehension of the existence of individual things in the world as Brahman is. One does not get the idea "this pot that I see now is eternally existent and is never sublated." 2) If the reality of each and every thing in the world is admitted, then it would take a significant number of "real" entities to explain what is meant by "reality." This theory would be too heavy, suffer from the defect of "gaurava" because of the lack of a common property or anugata dharma. An explanation using a single non-dual Reality is superior even from this strictly logical viewpoint.

    In the previous part of the series, we have seen how MadhusUdana refutes the charge of arthAntara, ie. proving something other than what he intended to. Next, MadhusUdana shows how mithyAtva can be redefined so that the opponent cannot even dream (no pun intended!) of making the charge of arthAntara. MadhusUdana alternatively defines mithyAtva as the absolute difference from sattva and the absolute difference from asattva. It must be noted that this alternative definition is not a new definition; it is entirely equivalent to the one accepted so far, ie. the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva.

    The alternate definition makes use of mutual absence or anyonya-abhAva as opposed to atyanta-abhAva in the first definition.

    MadhusUdana:
    satpratiyogika-asatpratiyogikabhedadvayaM vA sAdhyam.h | tathAcha ubhayAtmakatve .anyatarAtmakatve vA, tAdR^igbheda-asaMbhavena tAbhyAmarthAntara-anavakAshaH |

    Alternatively, (we may define) the sAdhya (the unreality of duality, mithyAtva) to be the difference that has existence as its counter- positive AND the difference that nonexistence as its counter-positive. (Simply put, mithyAtva is that which is different from existence AND different from nonexistence as well.) And there is no scope for (charging us with) arthAntara due to this because such difference from both (existence and nonexistence) or difference from one of them is not possible (according to our other opponents- the logicians, the Buddhists, and the view of VAchaspati Mishra in the nyAyavArttikatAtparyaTIkA).

    No aMshataH siddhasAdhana (no partially redundant proof)

    MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda. MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva. The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or non-existence.

    MadhusUdana refuted these objections. He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva, namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving something other than what is intended).

    The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two, say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real.

    So the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference from nonexistence is redundant. But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence. Why?

    Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sAdhya.)

    Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana:
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 11:03 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

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