View Full Version : Advaita Siddhi
03 April 2010, 11:25 AM
It has been felt that we have not seen the scholarly exposition of Advaita theories. So, let us take up Madhusudan Saraswati’s Advaita Siddhi for discussion.
I have taken full of this discussion from Shri Anand Hudli's (whom I don't know but have come to admire) excellent text and just formatted the pieces to make them suitable for pasting in this thread. Anyone interested to study the full text immediately may do so at http://www.advaitasiddhi.org/. I thank Anand, for his excellent effort. I also hope that this thread in HDF will also serve us well.
Madhusudan Saraswati does not seem to be a mere sadhu but a sadhu with a brilliant logician’s mind that can destroy any mithyAtva. In his best known work, called Advaita Siddhi, Madhusudan defined mithyAtva with three definitions that answer all possible Dvaita and Vishistaadvaita logical oppositions.
The first definition of mithyAtva says that what is mithyA is characterized by "sadasadanadhikaraNatva", not being the substratum of either sat (Existence) or asat (nonexistence).
The second definition of mithyAtva says that what is mithyA (unreal) is characterized as being the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation (asat) in the very substratum where it (the thing that is mithyA) is cognized.
The third definition in the advaita-siddhi simply says: YAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |, Unreality is the property of being sublated by knowledge or cognition.
Note: pratiyogin an adversary , rival ; any object dependent upon another and not existing without it ; a partner , associate ; a counterpart , match .
03 April 2010, 11:27 AM
||shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
|| shrIviTThalaM namAmi ||
The advaita-siddhi is regarded as one of the most important polemical works of advaita. It is MadhusUdana sarasvatI's brilliant and successful defense of advaita in response to the objections of the MAdhvas, the dualists. Shankara states that his doctrine of brahmajnAna (brahmajnAnamapi vastutantrameva - brahma-sUtra- bhAshhya 1.1.2) is a "vastu-tantra", a doctrine based on facts, as opposed to a "purushha-tantra", a doctrine based on the knowledge of an individual. One can raise objections against individual opinions but facts cannot be objected to; they can possibly be misunderstood. One can possibly express ignorance of facts but not argue against them. So one may ask: how is it possible for the mAdhvas to raise objections against advaita that is based on facts? It is not possible. What the MAdhvas, the dvaitins, have done is to express misunderstandings, not objections.
It is, therefore, proper to answer the so-called objections of the mAdhvas by clearing their misunderstandings of advaita. But it must also be mentioned that, in some cases at least, it appears that the misunderstandings are not genuine misunderstandings but misunderstandings introduced on purpose to A) misrepresent advaita first and then, B) to try to refute the resulting misrepresentation. Nevertheless, advaitins should remove all misunderstandings, whether they be genuine or otherwise, and no advaitin has done this better than MadhusUdana SarasvatI, the great logician from Bengal.
I endeavor here to present some glimpses of the advaita-siddhi's great treasures, treasures that are to be cherished for all time. In a forum like this one, it is hard, if not impossible, to do justice to such a monumental work as the advaita-siddhi. So I will endeavor to present only a few discussions with translation, consulting the explanations of Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya in his advaita-siddhi-vyAkhyA, of BrahmAnanda in his GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghuchandrikA) commentary on the advaita-siddhi, and of ViTThala upAdhyAya in his commentary on the laghu-chandrikA. All these works, namely the advaita-siddhi, siddhi-vyAkhyA, GauDa-brahmAnandI, and also the viTThaleshopAdhyAyI commentary on the GauDa-brahmA-nandI, all in the original Sanskrit, have been edited by Pandit Anantakrishna Sastri and published by Parimal Publications, Delhi,in 1988.
A few words about the authors. MadhusUdana sarasvatI is a towering giant among advaitins. An oft quoted verse regarding him is:
madhusUdanasarasvatyAH pAraM vetti sarasvatI |
pAraM vetti sarasvatyAH madhusUdanasarasvatI ||
(Only) the Goddess of Learning, sarasvatI knows the limits of(knowledge of) MadhusUdana sarasvatI. And MadhusUdana sarasvatI knows the limits of (knowledge of) Goddess sarasvatI!
He is said to have had three illustrious gurus. He learned mImAMsA from mAdhava sarasvatI, vedAnta from rAmatIrtha, and took sannyAsa dIxA from vishveshvara sarasvatI. Apart from the advaita-siddhi which is MadhusUdana's "crest-jewel", he is said to have written numerous other works, including a lucid commentary on the gItA called gUDhArtha-dIpikA, and a work called "advaita-ratna-laxana", a refutation of the work "bheda-ratna" by the logician shankara mishra.
MadhusUdana demonstrates his ability as a master logician in the advaita-siddhi, which he wrote as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita of the mAdhva exponent, vyAsatIrtha. MadhusUdana was so accomplished in navya-nyAya (logic) techniques that the following verse is quoted about him when he visited navadvIpa, the center for learning in nyAya-shAstra.
navadvIpe samAyAte madhusUdanavAkpatau chakampe tarkavAgIshaH kAtaro .abhUd.h gadAdharaH ||
When MadhusUdana, the master of speech, came to navadvIpa, MathurAnAtha tarkavAgIsha (who was the foremost navya naiyAyika during those times) trembled (with fear) and GadAdhara (another logician of great repute) became afraid.
Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya, the author of siddhi-vyAkhyA, is said to have a been a favorite student of MadhusUdana. BrahmAnanda, the author of gauDabrahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA), wrote the work as a response to the nyAyAmR^ita-taraN^giNI of the dvaitin (dualist) rAmAchArya. BrahmAnanda was the student of nArAyaNa tIrtha, a student of MadhusUdana. Finally, ViTThalesha upAdhyAya, a brAhmaNa of the Konkan region, has also placed the followers of advaita under his debt for writing a lucid commentary on the gaUDa-brahmAnandI.
03 April 2010, 11:30 AM
The First Definition of Unreality
|| shrIvishhNave namaH ||
Verse 1 of the advaita-siddhi
mAyAkalpita-mAtR^itA-mukha-mR^ishhA-dvaitaprapaJNchAshrayaH satya-GYAna-sukhAtmakaH shruti-shikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharaH |
mithyA-bandha-vidhUnanena paramAnandaika-tAnAtmakaM mokshhaM prApta iva svayaM vijayate vishhNur-vikalporjjhitaH ||1 ||
Translation based on siddhivyAkhyA of Balabhadra bhaTTAchArya and GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA) of BrahmAnanda
VishhNu shines supreme, He who is the substratum (basis) of the world of duality beginning with the notion of cognizer (mAtR^i),of duality that is false and fabricated by mAyA, He whose nature is Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss, He who is realized by the undifferentiated (undivided) direct experience arising from the mahAvAkyas of vedAnta, He who by shaking off the false bonds (of mAyA) has attained, as it were, mokshha wholly consisting of supreme bliss, and He who becomes free from all variety, manifoldness (vikalpa). (1)
Review of navya nyAya concepts
A review of some concepts and terms from nyAya is in order before we proceed further. Please see "Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic" by Ingalls or "The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation" by Bimal Krishna Matilal for more details.
Process of inference: Every noneternal entity, according to nyAya, must be a result of an instrumental cause (karaNa) and an operation (vyApAra). An inference (anumAna), that is a means to knowledge of man and hence noneternal, must have an instrumental cause and an operation by which the cause brings about the inference. In the process of inference, the operation is called parAmarsha or consideration, and the instrumental cause is the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyApti), also called pervasion. This vyApti corresponds very roughly to logical implication in Western logic. In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the instrumental cause, karaNa is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance, "smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire", vahni-vyApyo dhUmaH, ie. where there is smoke there is fire.
The operation, vyApAra is the consideration (parAmarsha) that is knowledge of the occurrence of the concomitant in the subject (pakshha) where the inference is being made. In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke", the parAmarsha will be of the form, "the mountain possesses smoke which is an invariable concomitant of fire" - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h In polemical treatises and debates, an inference is stated tersely by listing the inference (conclusion) followed by a single word representing the application of the consideration and the invariable concomitance. For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain possesses fire because of smoke." In every inference, there are evident three terms, called 1) sAdhya or that which is to be proved, 2) the hetu or linga, the concomitant, and 3) the subject or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur. In the inference, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke", the sAdhya is vahni (fire), the hetu is smoke, and the pakshha is parvata (mountain).
In the standard form of inference, the three terms are placed as follows: pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-suffix hetu-in-ablative-case For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire because of smoke." The definition of vyApti is very important. It is defined by the bhAshhA-parichchheda (of VishvanAtha) as: vyAptiH sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaMbandha udAhR^itaH | Invariable concomitance is said to be the absence of relation of the (hetu) to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya. Here the relation should be the same as the relation under consideration for the vyApti. As per this definition of vyApti, smoke is an invariable concomitant of fire (or smoke is "pervaded" by fire) because it is not the case that there is something that has smoke but not fire. However, fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke.
There are things such as a red-hot iron rod that has fire but no smoke. So fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke. A relation between two entities is often explained as the superimposition of one entity on the other. Here, the entity that is superimposed is called the superstratum or Adheya. The entity on which the Adheya is superimposed is called substratum or locus. Sanskrit names for "substratum" is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa.
In the example, bhUtale ghaTo vartate, "there is a pot on the ground", the superstratum is the pot (ghaTa), the ground (bhUtalam.h) is the substratum or locus, and the relation is "contact", saMyoga. Another way of looking at relations (saMbandha) is to differentiate between what Ingalls calls "occurrence-exacting" and "non occurrence exacting" relations. Relations such as inherence (samavAya) are always occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the relation between a whole and its parts, a genus or class (jAti) and a particular instance of the class, etc. Contact (saMyoga) can sometimes be occurrence exacting but sometimes not. In relation between two entities, one of the entities is an adjunct or pratiyogin, and the other is a subjunct or anuyogin.
If a relation is such that one entity is a locus or substratum (AdhAra) of the other which must be the superstratum (Adheya), then the AdhAra is the subjunct or anuyogin. The Adheya is the adjunct or pratiyogin. In the example, bhUtale ghaTaH, "there is a pot on the ground", ghaTa is the pratiyogin while bhUtalam.h is the anuyogin. Two types of absences (abhAva) are distinguished in navya-nyAya. One is called anyonya-abhAva that is essentially a denial of identity between to entities. The other is saMsarga-abhAva or relational absence. Here, there are three kinds: 1) prAgabhAva, the absence of a thing before it is brought into being, 2) dhvamsAbhAva, the absence of a thing after it is destroyed, and 3) atyanta-abhAva, eternal absence. The terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are also used in the context of absences. When we say "bhUtale ghaTo nAsti", "there is no pot on the ground", the pratiyogin of the absence is "ghaTa", pot, and the anuyogin is "bhUtalam.h", ground. The pratiyogin of this type should be called "abhAvIya-pratiyogin" to distinguish it from the relational adjunct, but naiyAyikas often write "pratiyogin" for both relational and absential adjuncts.
Some of the properties that are commonly used in naiyAyika literature are those that correspond to the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa (locus), vishhayin (knowledge), vishhaya (content of knowledge), visheshhya (qualificand), visheshhaNa (qualifier), prakAra (chief qualifier), etc. The abstract properties or relational abstracts of these are formed by simply adding the suffix, "tva" or "tA" to each term. For example, one may write sAdhyatva to mean "the property of being a sAdhya" or "sAdhya-ness", hetutva or "the property of being a hetu" or "hetu-ness", etc.
A sentence of the form, parvato vahnimAn.h, "the mountain (parvata) has fire (vahni)", can be first rewritten as parvato vahnyadhikaraNam.h, "the mountain is a locus or substratum of fire". This is then analyzed by the naiyAyika as follows: parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA | The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by vahni. Or parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishhThAdheyatA nirUpitA | The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by the AdheyatA (superstratum-ness) resident in fire. The most characteristic terms of navya-nyAya are "avachchhedaka" (limitor) and "avachchhinna" (limited). These terms are used in the context of relational abstracts or abstract properties. An entity, such as a pot (ghaTa), is said to be qualified by a qualifier, but a relational abstract is said to be limited by a limitor.
Let us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, "the mountain has fire." Here, the mountain is a substratum (adhikaraNa) of fire which is the superstratum (Adheya). The adhikaraNatA in parvata is described by vahni (fire), but this adhikaraNatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by parvatatva. Similarly, the AdheyatA in vahni (fire) is said to be described by parvata but this AdheyatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by vahnitva or fire-ness. So a navya-naiyAyika would write:
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatva- avachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishhThAdheyatA sA parvata-nirUpita-vahnitva-avachchhinnAdheyatA |
The adhikaraNatA in mountain is described by fire and limited by parvatatva (mountain-ness), and the AdheyatA in fire is described by mountain and limited by vahnitva (fire-ness). A generic relational abstract may also be limited. In the sentence, "a stick is the instrumental cause of a pot", daNDo nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with respect to a specific pot and stick. The assertion is generally about all sticks and pots. So the naiyAyika writes: daNDatvaM ghaTa-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h | Stick-ness is the limitor of instrumental-cause-ness described by pot.
03 April 2010, 11:31 AM
The first definition of mithyAtva - objections
Earlier, MadhusUdana set forth the objective of establishing the unreality (mithyAtva) of duality (dvaita), or in other words the unreality of the world (jaganmithyAtva). After a brief digression of navya-nyAya, we will now look at the first definition of mithyAtva (unreality) that comes under attack from the mAdhva opponent. This definition is the one given by PadmapAdAchArya in his PanchapAdikA.
advaita-siddhi --------------- atha
prathamamithyAtva-vichAraH | The opponent criticizes the definition of mithyAtva as follows:
nanu kimidaM mithyAtvaM sAdhyate, na tAvat.h "mithyAshabdo- anirvachanIyatAvachana" iti panchapAdikAvachanAt.h sadasad- anadhikaraNatvarUpamanirvAchyatvam.h, taddhi kiM asatva- vishishhTa-sattvAbhAvaH, uta sattvAtyantAbhAva-asattva-atyanta- abhAvarUpaM dharmadvayam.h, Ahosvit.h sattvAtyanta-abhAvavatve sati asattva-atyanta-abhAvarUpaM vishishhTam.h |
Now, what is this unreality (mithyAtva) that (you) want to infer (as characterizing the world)? This unreality is by no means non-definability as defined by the statement of the panchapAdikA that the word mithyA (unreal) is denoted by non-definability, the non-definability being of the nature of NOT being the substratum (adhikaraNa) of either existence or non-existence. What is "not being the substratum of existence or non-existence"?
Is it 1) the absence of existence qualified by non-existence or 2) the pair of attributes of (a). absolute absence of existence and (b). absolute absence of non-existence, or 3) the property of the absolute absence of nonexistence during the absolute absence of existence, ie. being a common substratum of the attributes - the absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of non-existence?
nAdyaH, sattvamAtrAdhAre jagatyasattvavishishhTasattva-anabhyu- pagamAt, vishishhTa-abhAva-sAdhane siddha-sAdhanAt.h |
(You) cannot (claim) the first (regarding the world) because the world is the substratum of only existence (sattva) and existence qualified by non-existence is not admitted. And by proving the absence of existence as qualified by non-existence, (you commit the flaw of) proving what is already established (siddha-sAdhana).
na dvitIyaH, sattva-asattvayorekAbhAve aparasattva-avashyakatvena vyAghAtAt.h, nirdharmakabrahmavatsattva-asattva-rAhitye .api sadrUpatvena amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntarAchcha, shuktirUpye abAdhyatvarUpasattva-vyatirekasya sattvena bAdhyatvarUpa-asattvasya vyatireka-asiddhyA sAdhyavaikalyAchcha |
(You) cannot (claim) the second. Because, wherever there is an absence of one of existence and nonexistence, there the presence of the other is necessary; this leads to a contradiction. (Also), the world, just like the Brahman without attributes, even being without the attributes, existence and nonexistence, by (its very) nature of existence, is established as NOT unreal; this would lead to (the defect of) arthAntara, proving something other than what is to be proved.
In the silver-in-nacre (example of illusion that is often quoted by advaitins to show the ontological status of the world), (we grant that) it (silver-nacre) is without existence whose nature is non-sublatability (noncontradicted-ness), (but) the absence of nonexistence, whose nature is sublatibility (contradicted-ness), is NOT established; this leads to the defectiveness of (your) sAdhya, what (you) seek to prove.
ata eva na tR^itIyaH, pUrvavadvyAghAtAt.h, arthAntarAtsAdhya- vaikalyAchcha
For the very same reason(s) as before, the third (alternative in defining mithyAtva, ie. the common substratum of the attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence) cannot (be claimed) because of the fallacies of contradiction (violation of the law of the excluded middle), proving something other than what is intended, and defectiveness of the sAdhya.
MadhusUdana now begins his reply thus:
iti chet.h, maivam.h
If this is what you say, it is unjustified.
03 April 2010, 11:33 AM
Brief recap: We have seen that mithyAtva (unreality) can be defined as anirvachanIyatva (property of not being definable), and this anirvachanIyatva can further be explained as sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or nonexistence. The opponent lists three ways in which this sadasadanadhikaraNatva may be defined. He finds fault with each of these definitions. MadhusUdana disagrees and starts his counter-argument.
sattva-atyanta-abhAva-asattva-atyanta-abhAva-rUpa-dharma- dvaya-vivaxAyAM doshhAbhAvAt.h | nacha vyAhatiH |
In the intended meaning of "sadasad-anadhikaraNa" (not being the substratum of existence or nonexistence) as "the pair of attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of nonexistence", there is NO defect. There is NO contradiction too. (Why?)
sA hi sattvAsattvayoH parasparaviraharUpatayA vA, paraspara- virahavyApakatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApyatayA vA |
That (contradiction could result) only if 1) existence and nonexistence mutually negate each other or 2) they mutually pervade each other's absence (one's absence is the invariable concomitant of the other), or 3) they are mutually pervaded by each other's absence (one is the invariable concomitant of the other's absence). (PS: Recall the definition of vyApti in the third part of this series.)
tatra nAdyaH, tadanaN^gIkArAt.h | tathAhyatra trikAlAbAdhyatva- sattva-vyatireko nAsattvam.h, kintu kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatva-anadhikaraNatvam.h | tadvyatirekashcha sAdhyatvena vivaxitaH |
There is no (presence of the) first condition, because it is not accepted. It is so (not accepted) because the negation of existence, that is not sublatable at any time, past, present, or future, is NOT nonexistence, but (nonexistence means) NOT being cognized as existing in any substratum (at any time). The negation of that (nonexistence) is what is intended to be (part of) what is to be proved.
tathAcha trikAlAbAdhyavilaxaNatve sati kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatvarUpaM sAdhyaM paryavasitam.h | evaMcha sati na shuktirUpye sAdhyavaikalyamapi | bAdhyatvarUpAsattvavyatirekasya sAdhyApraveshAt.h | nApi vyAghAtaH, parasparaviraharUpatva- abhAvAt.h |
The conclusion to be established is that while being different from that which is never sublatable, it is (capable of) being cognized as existing in some substratum. And this being so, there is no defect of the sAdhya's (being absent) in silver-in-nacre. (This is) because the negation of nonexistence which is sublatable (always) does not form part of what is to be established (sAdhya). (What does form part of the sAdhya is the negation of nonexistence which consists in not being cognized in any locus or substratum at any time). (Therefore,) there is no contradiction too (here) because there is no mutual negation between (existence and nonexistence).
ata eva na dvitIyo .api, sattvAbhAvavati shuktirUpye vivaxita- asattvavyatirekasya vidyamAnatvena vyabhichArAt.h |
For this reason, the second condition (under which contradiction can occur) does not hold too. (There can be no invariable concomitance of the absence of existence or nonexistence with the other.) (The requirement for such concomitance to hold is not satisfied) due to deviation (vyabhichAra), since in (illusory things such as) the silver-in-nacre, there is the absence of existence, but the absence of the nonexistence with the intended definition (as above) is also cognized. (In order for the concomitance to hold, nonexistence would have to be present when existence is absent.)
nApi tR^itIyaH tasya vyAghAta-aprayojakatvAt.h, gotva-ashvatvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayor-ushhTrAdAvekatra sahopalaMbhAt.h |
The third condition does not cause contradiction. (For example,) cow-ness (the property of being a cow) and horse-ness (property of being a horse) are invariable concomitants of each other's absence (ie. where cow-ness is present, horse-ness is absent and where horse-ness is present, cow-ness is absent). Even so, the two properties (of cow-ness and horse-ness) are NOT present in the same locus such as a camel, etc., and (the absences of cow-ness and horse-ness are) perceived thus together (in the same locus).
tatashcha sattva-asattvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayorekatra prapaJNche saMbhavAnna vyAhatiriti dhyeyam.H|
And therefore, even though existence and nonexistence are invariable concomitants of each other's absence, the absences of both CAN occur in the same place, ie. the world and due to (this) there is NO contradiction. This is to be thought of.
03 April 2010, 11:35 AM
After rejecting the claim made by the opponent that the definitions of sadasadanadhikaraNatva are faulty, MadhusUdana next shows that the charge made regarding arthAntara is also not valid.
MadhusUdana's reply (continued):
yachcha - nirdharmakasya brahmaNaH sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavat- prapaJNchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- uktam.h| tanna |
And the (opponent) said: Just as the attributeless Brahman lacks existence (as an attribute) but (Its) very nature is existence, the very nature of the world too is existence. This establishes that the world is not mithyA (unreal). By this (it follows that you will have) established something other (than what you wanted to) - arthAntara. (We say): It is not so.
ekenaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau brahmavat.h prapaJNchasya pratyekaM satsvabhAvatAkalpena mAnAbhAvAt.h, anugata-vyavahAra-abhAva-prasaN^gAchcha |
The understanding of sat (existence) as encompassing everything and everywhere is established by One (principle). (But) each and every thing in the world cannot be proved to be comprehended as (pure) existence in the same way as Brahman. And a contingency would arise due to the lack of a comprehensive system (of understanding, explaining, and discussing a large number of things and topics.) (Therefore, the claim that we would be committing the fallacy of arthAntara is not correct.)
MadhusUdana is making a crucial point here regarding what is technically called anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. When a property occurs in a number of different things, the naiyAyika would search for a common term or common concept to represent this common property and then refer to each of those things as possessing that common property. For example, if a pot is blue, a lotus is blue, and a cloth is blue, the naiyAyika would make "blue-ness" a common property and say that the pot possesses "blue-ness", the lotus possesses "blue-ness", and so on. Such a system wherein a number of things are explained using fewer concepts is said to have the advantage of "lAghava" or light-ness as compared to a system where a greater number of concepts are required, in which case a defect of "gaurava" or heaviness is said to prevail. This is directly related to the principle of "Occam's razor" as used in the West.
If I can explain a certain number of things using some hypotheses and you can explain the same things using fewer hypotheses than mine, then your explanation is better than mine. In keeping with the principle of "lAghava" or lightness rather than heaviness, the naiyAyika-logician is always looking for anugata dharma's or common properties to explain things. In the case at hand, the opponent says that just as Brahman is by Its very nature existence, the duality in the world is also similarly by its very nature existence and hence real.
MadhusUdana points out two problems with this claim: 1) There is no comprehension of the existence of individual things in the world as Brahman is. One does not get the idea "this pot that I see now is eternally existent and is never sublated." 2) If the reality of each and every thing in the world is admitted, then it would take a significant number of "real" entities to explain what is meant by "reality." This theory would be too heavy, suffer from the defect of "gaurava" because of the lack of a common property or anugata dharma. An explanation using a single non-dual Reality is superior even from this strictly logical viewpoint.
In the previous part of the series, we have seen how MadhusUdana refutes the charge of arthAntara, ie. proving something other than what he intended to. Next, MadhusUdana shows how mithyAtva can be redefined so that the opponent cannot even dream (no pun intended!) of making the charge of arthAntara. MadhusUdana alternatively defines mithyAtva as the absolute difference from sattva and the absolute difference from asattva. It must be noted that this alternative definition is not a new definition; it is entirely equivalent to the one accepted so far, ie. the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva.
The alternate definition makes use of mutual absence or anyonya-abhAva as opposed to atyanta-abhAva in the first definition.
satpratiyogika-asatpratiyogikabhedadvayaM vA sAdhyam.h | tathAcha ubhayAtmakatve .anyatarAtmakatve vA, tAdR^igbheda-asaMbhavena tAbhyAmarthAntara-anavakAshaH |
Alternatively, (we may define) the sAdhya (the unreality of duality, mithyAtva) to be the difference that has existence as its counter- positive AND the difference that nonexistence as its counter-positive. (Simply put, mithyAtva is that which is different from existence AND different from nonexistence as well.) And there is no scope for (charging us with) arthAntara due to this because such difference from both (existence and nonexistence) or difference from one of them is not possible (according to our other opponents- the logicians, the Buddhists, and the view of VAchaspati Mishra in the nyAyavArttikatAtparyaTIkA).
No aMshataH siddhasAdhana (no partially redundant proof)
MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda. MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva. The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or non-existence.
MadhusUdana refuted these objections. He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva, namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving something other than what is intended).
The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two, say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real.
So the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference from nonexistence is redundant. But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence. Why?
Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sAdhya.)
Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana:
03 April 2010, 11:36 AM
Advaita Siddhi text contd.
Text: nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h |
"guNAdikaM guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhikR^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge tArkikAdyaN^gIkR^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddher- yathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvA- nna siddha-sAdhanam.h |
yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH kuMbha iti sAmAnAdhi- karaNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR^ite .api sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayojakatayA militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h |
Translation: (And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana (aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND non-different from each other. In arguing with the tArkikas (the naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference (of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas) say: "the quality and its possessor are different and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be related by a relation of non-difference." (So, they say,) there is no siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved.
Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved) is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva). So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning).
(You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say, no!)
In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established. (This is your stand.) Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent thing that lacks existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva and difference from asattva) is a prayojaka (a necessary factor) for dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing of that CONJUNCTION is what is intended.
03 April 2010, 11:42 AM
The Second Definition of Unreality
The Second Definition
Continuing with the series on the advaita-siddhi, we will next study the second definition of mithyAtva that is defended by MadhusUdana SarasvatI. It is especially useful to be familiar with basic nyAya terminology as explained in the third and fourth parts of the series. Without such familiarity, the discussion below may not make much sense at all!
pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |
Alternatively, mithyAtva (unreality) of something is that which is the counter-positive or absential adjunct (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation (a negation for all three periods of time, past, present, and future) in the very substratum where it (the thing) is cognized.
This is the second definition of mithyAtva that is taken up by MadhusUdana in his defense of mithyAtva of dvaita. This alternative definition is based on shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana", as BrahmAnanda says in his gauDabrahmAnandI, "neha nAnAstI"tyAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha". The second definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya, PrakAshAtman, the author of the PanchapAdikA-vivaraNa.
It is important to understand this definition and the significance of the terms involved. As in the case of the first definition of mithyAtva, what is alIka or a fictitious entity is NOT the mithyAtva that is used to describe the world. The mithyAtva of the world is akin to the illusion of the snake over a rope or silver in nacre. Upon realizing that the snake is illusory, one exclaims "The snake is unreal. The snake was never there to begin with, it is not there now, and it will never be there in the future!" This is the mithyAtva (unreality) of the world that is being talked about.
One important point to remember is that the in order for a thing to be mithyA or unreal according to this definition, it MUST be cognized or perceived in some susbtratum. This is a necessary condition for something to be called mithyA. What is perceived is called mithyA. That which can never be perceived, a chimera such as the horns of a hare, is NOT being called mithyA. Rather it is asat. And Brahman is sat.
MithyAtva is different from these two, ie. mithyAtva is sadasadvilaxaNa.
The first definition of mithyAtva is refined by the second definition. All that the first definition really says is that mithyA is something that is different from the absolutely real Brahman and from a fictitious entity. As per the first definition, the thing that is mithyA should be 1) cognized in some locus (substratum) and 2) be sublated (negated) at some time.
The second definition refines the first by saying that the thing that is mithyA is 1) sublated in the very locus where it is cognized and 2) and it is sublated so for ALL times.
Objections to the second definition
The objection of the opponent is based on the acceptance by advaitins of three orders of reality as defined in, for example, the Vedaanta
paribhaashhaa of dharmaraaja adhvarin: yadvaa trividhaM sattvaM -- paaramaarthikasattvaM brahmaNaH, vyaavahaarikaM sattvamaakaashaadeH, praatibhaasikaM sattvaM shuktirajataadeH |
The absolute reality of Brahman is paaramaarthika satya, the empirical reality of the objective world, which includes space etc., is vyaavahaarika satya, and the illusory appearance of silver in nacre (oyster-shell), etc. is praatibhaasika satya.
The Objection in brief: The objection by the opponent is aimed to trap the advaitin in an unrecoverable position by pointing out defects in any assignment of ontological status to the negation (sublation) used in the second definition of the mithyAtva.
nanu, pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhasya tAttvikatve advaita- hAniH prAtibhAsikatve siddha-sAdhanaM, vyAvahArikatve .api tasya bAdhyatvena tAttvikasattvAvirodhitayA arthAntaraM, advaitashruter- atattvAvedakatvaM cha tatpratiyoginaH prAtibhAsikasya prapaJNchasya pAramArthikatvaM cha syAt.h,
Translation: Objection by the opponent: Now, if the absolute negation (of a thing, such as the world, that is being called mithyA as per the second definition) is absolutely real (pAramArthika), then the basic principle of advaita (non-dualism) is destroyed! (If the absolute negation) is only illusory (prAtibhAsika), then you are proving what is already established (ie. the reality of the world). Even (if the absolute negation) is empirical (vyAvahArika), you will be proving something other than what you intended because (such negation) will not be opposed to the absolute reality (of the world). The shruti texts that are non-dualistic will be incapable of revealing the truth. And (if it be claimed that) the world is illusory, (that will not hold) and (the world) would have absolute reality (pAramAthikatva).
Let us examine the opponent's objection in a little more detail. The opponent says: You define three orders of reality - pAramArthika, vyAvahArika, and prAtibhAsika. And you have defined mithyAtva as the counter-positive-ness of the absolute negation (for all periods of time) in the very substratum where the thing that is mithyA is cognized. In essence, you would like to categorize the world as mithyA.
Now, what reality do you assign to such a negation of the world? 1) Is this negation pAramArthika (absolutely real)? 2) Is this negation prAtibhAsika (illusory) ? 3) Or, is this negation vyAvahArika (empirical) ? Regardless of the type of reality you assign to this negation, you run into problems.
1) The negation of the world is pAramArthika. In this case, you have a direct contradiction with the non-dual principle of advaita.
BrahmAnanda explains the objection: advaita-hAniH "neha nAne"tyAdishrutibodhitasya brahmaNi dR^ishya- sAmAnyAbhAvasya virodhaH
(There is) damage to the principle of non-duality as known from shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" (there is no manifold-ness here whatsoever) (because) of the contradiction due to the common absence of the "perceived" (dR^ishya). If the negation of the world is pAramArthika, then you have two such realities - 1) Brahman, and 2) the said negation of the world. This compromises the non-duality principle.
2) The negation of the world is prAtibhAsika, illusory. In this case, you have siddha-sAdhana-doshha.
kapAle ghaTo nAstItyAdibhrame prAtItikasya- atyantAbhAvasya vishhayatvena siddha-sAdhanamityarthaH |
siddha-sAdhana means that in cases of erroneous cognition or illusion such as denying the pot in its parts, the absolute absence of the (erroneously) cognized negation is already established (in another system). In other words, if you say the negation is illusory, such as the negation of a pot in its two halves, such a position is already admitted by another system. (A whole is said "inhere" in its parts as per nyAya. So a whole, such as a pot, cannot be denied in its parts. Any such denial is erroneous.) In other words, if you say the negation of the world is illusory or erroneous, that is already admitted by the realist schools. So you are committing the mistake of siddha-sAdhana.
3)The negation of the world is vyAvahArika. In this case, what you are saying is that the negation of the world will itself get sublated upon realization of Brahman. What does this mean? The world itself CANNOT be vyAvahArika because it is absurd (a contradiction) to say that the world as well as its negation get sublated upon Brahman realization. Either the world or its negation can get sublated at the same time but not both! Therefore, you are left with two possibilities – (a). the world is pAramArthika or absolutely real OR (b). the world is prAtibhAsika or illusory. But you deny the world is illusory, and so the world can only be pAramArthika.
This point is stated by BrahmAnanda as:
prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena pAramArthikatvameva balAtsyAditi bhAvaH |
(Since the world) cannot possibly be illusory it is forced to be absolutely real (pAramArthika) only. This is the purport (of the opponent).
Again, ViTThalesha explains why the world cannot be illusory when he comments on the term "prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena" of BrahmAnanda:
brahmaGYAnAnyAbAdhyatvAditi (The world cannot be illusory) because (it is admitted by the advaitin) to remain un-sublated (not negated) by anything other than knowledge of Brahman. So what is the result of accepting the world as pAramArthika and the negation of the world as vyAvahArika? These are the defects. First, you will have established the world as absolutely real which is different from what you set out to prove. This is the defect of arthAntara. Second, the shruti texts that speak of non-duality such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" will have to be accepted as NOT revealing the ultimate truth because they can only reveal what is empirical ( vyAvahArika), ie. the negation of the world.
In response to the objection of the opponent, MadhusUdana now begins his reply:
iti chet.h? na |
If this is what you say, we say no!
03 April 2010, 11:44 AM
MadhusUdana's reply to the objection to the Second Definition
To understand MadhusUdana's reply to the objection (advaita-siddhi 12), we need to find out what it means to negate something in the world.
Shankara states in his commentary on gItA 2.16:
sarvatra buddhidvayopalabdheH, sadbuddhiH asadbuddhiH iti |
yadvishhayA buddhiH na vyabhicharati tat.h sat.h, yadvishhayA vyabhicharati tat.h asat.h|
There are two cognitions everywhere (in any cognition in the world) - cognition of the real and cognition of the unreal. That cognition which does not change is real (sat) and that which changes is unreal (mithyA). [Please note that Shankara's usage of asat corresponds to mithyA.]
In the cognition, "the pot is" (san.h ghaTaH), the permanent factor is " is" which indicates the underlying existence. What is an illusion is "the pot". What is cognized is just this permanent factor but it is falsely understood to be a pot by the super-imposition (adhyAsa) of the name-and-form on the underlying Existence (sat).
In another cognition, "the cloth is" (san.h paTaH), again the common, permanent factor is "is." What is an illusion has to do with "the cloth." In other words, between the cognitions "the pot is", and "the cloth is", what is common, constant, and permanent is the factor, "is."
What we see above is a cognition where the cognizer gives a name to a cognized object, such as a pot, cloth etc. Another type of cognition tries to assert an adjective or attribute of an object. In the cognition, "the blue pot is", again what is common, constant, and permanent is the factor "is." What is illusion is "the blue pot." So what is being denied ultimate reality is the "blueness" and "potness" of the object but not pure existence indicated by "is".
Generalizing this to all cognitions, all objects are real as far as they are treated as pure existence, but the moment you start associating them with names and forms, the illusion begins. This Existence is the common, unchanging, and permanent factor among all cognitions.
Therefore, status of anything in the world may be said to be comprised of two components 1) a Real part and 2) an unreal part.
So every cognition is made of two parts - a real part, E and an unreal part, X. Shankara assures us that the real part E remains the same for all cognitions while the unreal part X changes. So we come to the interesting question: what does it mean to negate something in the world, such as a pot? It is clear that the real component of the pot, which is Existence, can NEVER be negated. However, the unreal name-and-form (nAma-rUpa) component of the pot can be negated. This means only one thing. The negation of the pot also has two components - 1) a real component, Existence (Being) and 2) an unreal component that negates only the unreal component, name-and-form (nAma-rUpa), of the pot.
This is essentially what MadhusUdana says. The negation of the world has two components. The real component (pAramArthika) is identical with Brahman (sat) and the unreal component is of the same order of reality as the world, ie. vyAvahArika. The unreal component of the negation only negates the unreal component of the world. We will first see how
MadhusUdana explains the real component of the negation.
prapaJNchanishhedha-adhikaraNIbhUta-brahmAbhinnatvAnnishhedhasya tAtvikatve .api na-advaitahAnikaratvam.h |
na cha tAtvikAbhAva- pratiyoginaH prapaJNchasya tAtvikApattiH, tAtvikAbhAvapratiyogini shuktirajatAdau kalpite vyabhichArAt.h |
Translation: (If we hold that) the negation (of the world) is non-different from Brahman which is the substratum of the negation of the world, then there is no damage done to the non-duality principle. And the world as the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absolutely real (pAramArthika) negation cannot be (forced to be) absolutely real (based on an erroneous rule that the pratiyogin of a negation and the negation itself must necessarily belong to the same order of reality.) An exception (to this rule which proves the rule to be erroneous) is the silver-in-nacre that is (illusory only) and its negation (at the end of illusion) which is real.
To understand MadhusUdana's stand, we need to examine how negation or absence (abhAva) is treated in different systems. The questions are: 1) Is abhAva a category (padArtha) in itself? in other words, do we have a cognition of abhAva? 2) Through what means of cognition (pramANa) is abhAva cognized?
The bhATTa-mImAMsakas, for example, hold that abhAva is a separate category and it is cognized through a separate pramANa called anupalabdhi or non-apprehension. The naiyAyikas and MAdhvas hold that abhAva is a separate category but they do not recognize a separate pramANa like anupalabdhi for it, and hold that abhAva can be known through standard pramANas such as perception, inference, and verbal testimony. The prAbhAkara-mImAMsakas hold that abhAva is not a category in itself, nor is there a pramANa such as anupalabdhi.
For example, consider the sentence "there is no pot on the ground", - bhUtale ghaTo nAsti.
Here, an absence or negation of a pot is being asserted with respect to the ground, the substratum. The bhATTas, naiyAyikas, and MAdhvas all accept that the absence of pot on the ground is cognized as separate from the ground. But the prAbhAkara-mImAMsakas hold that the absence of the pot is really identical to the ground, the substratum itself. One of the greatest prAbhAkara mImAMsakas, shAlikanAtha defines abhAva in the
dR^ishye pratiyogini yA tadekavishhayA buddhiH sA tadabhAvo vyapadishyate |
(prakaraNapaJNchikA) abhAva (negation or absence) is the cognition of the (substratum) alone while the pratiyogin (the thing that is negated) is supposed to have been perceived (had it been present).
When we say "there is no pot on the ground", we are really only saying that we perceive the ground alone where a pot was supposed to have been present. We do not perceive such a thing as "absence of pot" on the ground. Therefore, "absence of pot" is the same as the ground alone, the substratum. Here the pot which is supposed to have been present but not seen is the pratiyogin.
Earlier, it was stated that the negation of the world has two components - 1) a real component, Existence (sat) and 2) an unreal component that is the negation of the name-and-form aspects of the world. The real component can be identified with Brahman, the substratum, and agrees with the PrAbhAkara mImAMsA view of negation that equates the negation with the substratum. As to the objection that the negation and the thing negated must both belong to the same order of reality, MadhusUdana says this rule is flawed because there is an exception. In the illusion of silver in nacre, the silver is illusory (prAtibhAsika) but the negation of the silver (at the end of the illusion) is real or vyAvahArika at best which is of a different order of reality.
The unreal component of the negation, which is vyAvahArika, is discussed next by MadhusUdana.
03 April 2010, 11:47 AM
prapaJNchaniShedha (negation of the world) can also be vyAvahArika
BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedha-pratiyogitvam.h" (please see advaita-siddhi 10). Unreality is that which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the substratum where it is cognized.
So the opponent asks: Now, how do you classify this absolute negation that you speak of? Is this absolute negation pAramArthika, vyAvahArika or prAtibhAsika? We have seen how MadhusUdana has answered this question by pointing out that the absolute negation can be treated as pAramArthika, identical with Brahman. In doing so, there is no harm done to the non-duality principle. Also, the opponent cannot insist on the rule that a negation and its counter-positive (pratiyogin)have to have the same order of reality (sama-sattAka), because an exception that breaks the rule is readily found in the case of an illusion such as the silver-in-nacre illusion. The illusory silver is prAtibhAsika but its negation is pAramArthika if the substratum of illusion is treated as Brahman Itself or at least vyAvahArika, ifthe substratum is taken to be nacre.
Having shown how the negation can be pAramArthika, MadhusUdana now shows how the negation may also be treated as vyAvahArika. This corresponds to the unreal part of the negation.The basis of this approach to analyzing the negation is found in such treatises as the dR^ig-dR^ishya-viveka which says:
asti bhAti priyaM rUpaM nAma chetyaMshapaJNchakam.h |
AdyatrayaM brahmarUpaM jagadrUpaM tato dvayam.h || 20 ||
Everything has five factors: 1) Existence, 2) Consciousness 3) Bliss, 4) Name, and 5) Form. Of these, the first three are of the nature of Brahman and the last two (Name and Form) belong to the world.
khaMvAyvagnijalorvIshhu devatiryaN^.h narAdishhu |
abhinnAssachchidAnandAH bhidyete rUpanAmanI || 21 ||
In the elements, space, air, fire, water, and earth, in Gods, animals, and humans, (and other things in the world) what is non-different (constant, unchanging) are Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss. What are different (among all these things) are the Name and Form aspects.
[The first verse above also occurs in the sarasvatI-rahasya-upanishhad.]
When the world is negated, the sachchidAnanda aspect, which is un-negatable, remains. The nAma-rUpa aspects are negated. These were never real to begin with. A rough analogy, that has its own limitations, may be given to illustratethe two aspects of negation. Suppose we see a pot on the ground. Then the pot is removed. For a while after the pot has been removed, we "feel" the absence of the pot, although we continue to perceive the ground. During this phase, we perceive, in some sense, the absence of the pot, as well as the ground. Subsequently, we forget all about the pot. At this point, we are only aware of the ground, not the pot or its absence. Both the pot and its absence have been forgotten. There is no memory of either having existed.
In such a case, where the negation is cognized as different from the substratum, the negation can be taken to be the same order of reality as the thing that is negated, the pratiyogin. This is what MadhusUdana says next.
atAtvika eva vA nishhedho .ayam.h | atAtvikatve .api na prAtibhAsikaH,
kiMtu vyAvahArikaH| nacha - tarhi nishhedhasya bAdhyatvena tAtvikasattva-
avirodhitvAdarthAntaram-iti vAchyam.h | svApnArthasya svApnanishhedhena
bAdhadarshanAt.h | nishhedhasya bAdhyatvaM pAramArthikasattva-avirodhitve
na tantram.h, kiMtu nishhedhyApexayA nyUnasattAkatvam.h | prakR^ite cha
tulyasattAkatvAt.h kathaM na virodhitvam.h |
Or we may say that this negation (of the world) is unreal. Even though it is unreal, it is not illusory (prAtibhAsika), but empirical (vyAvahArika). And (you) cannot say:"Since the negation, that is itself sublatable, cannot be in opposition to the reality (of the world), there is the defect of proving something other than intended." (Why?) Because, of the instance of sublation of a dream-object along with its dream-negation. There is nodependence or implication of the non-opposition to absolute reality on the sublatability of the negation, but on the negation's being of a lower order of reality than the thing that is negated. In the present case, there is equality of the order of reality (of the negation and the thing that is negated, ie. the world). So how is there no opposition (to the reality of the world)?
MadhusUdana says here that the negation of the world can be viewed as vyAvahArika.
03 April 2010, 11:52 AM
This prompts an objection: If the negation of the world is vyAvahArika, then this negation should itself be sublated. Upon sublation of the negation of the world, the world's reality, not unreality, would be affirmed. That means the advaitin is proving something other than what he intended, a defect called arthAntara.
To this objection, MadhusUdana replies that it is not the case that world's reality would be affirmed upon sublation of the negation of the world. In the example of a dream, an object in the dream may be negated later in the same dream. And the negation itself is negated upon waking up. This does not result in the dream-object becoming real in the waking state!
So what implies the reality of a thing is NOT the mere fact that its negation is sublatable, but the fact that such negation is of a lesser order of reality than that of the thing itself.
For example, if we see a rope in semi-darkness and imagine it to be a snake,we may say "There is no rope." Here we are negating the rope. But this negation is illusory (prAtibhAsika). Upon removal of the illusion, we realize that the thing seen before is indeed a rope. So the rope, which was negated before, is being affirmed (as vyAvahArika). What has happened here is that the reality order of the negation is prAtibhAsika which is less than the reality order of the rope, vyAvahArika.
It is only in such cases that the reality of the thing negated may be affirmed, not otherwise. In the case under discussion, the negation of the world being described and the world are of the same order of reality. So the mere sublatability of the negation cannot make the world real.
BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedha-pratiyogitvam.h" (please see advaita-siddhi 10).Unreality is that which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the substratum where it is cognized. So the opponent asks: Now, how do you classify this absolute negation that you speak of? Is this absolute negation pAramArthika, vyAvahArika or prAtibhAsika?
We have seen how MadhusUdana has answered this question by pointing out that the absolute negation can be treated as pAramArthika, identical with Brahman. In doing so, there is no harm done to the non-duality principle. Also, the opponent cannot insist on the rule that a negation and its counter-positive (pratiyogin) have to have the same order of reality (sama-sattAka), because an exception that breaks the rule is readily found in the case of an illusion such as the silver-in-nacre illusion. The illusory silver is prAtibhAsika but its negation is pAramArthika if the substratum of illusion is treated as Brahman Itself or at least vyAvahArika, if the substratum is taken to be nacre.
03 April 2010, 11:53 AM
BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedha- pratiyogitvam.h".
Unreality is that which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the substratum where it is cognized.
Objection: The world is not a chimera
Now the opponent tries to show that the unreality of the world defined by the advaitin actually amounts to admitting that the world is a chimera (a vastu-shUnya) or a purely fictitious thing that is only imagined, but without a real basis. Is the world according to advaita a vastu-shUnya, a mere nothing or is it something with a real basis? Let us find out.
nanu evamatyanta-asattvApAtaH pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedha- pratiyogitvaM hyanyatra-asattvena saMpratipannasya ghaTAdeH sarvatra traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM paryavasitam.h ; anyathA teshhAM anyatra sattvApAtAt.h, nahi teshhAmanyatra sattA saMbhavatIti tvadukteshcha ; tathAcha kathamasadvailaxaNyam.h, nahi shashashR^iNgAderito .anyad- asattvam.h|
Translation: (Objection): Being the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absolute negation (for all three periods of time) in the very substratum where it (the thing that is unreal, mithyA) is cognized has thus been defined as being unreal (mithyA) (by you) and it is absolutely unreal (completely nonexistent). From this, it follows that things of the world, such as a pot, which are not existent in substrata other than where they are cognized, are eternally negated in all substrata! Otherwise, they would have to be existent in substrata other than where they are cognized. (But) you have said that they do not exist in other substrata. Accordingly, how is it that they (things of the world) are different from nonexistence (asat)? This (the world) is certainly not different from purely nonexistent things such as a hare's horn, (according to your view).
The gist of the argument here is that if the unreality of a thing consists in its being negated absolutely (for all periods of time) in the very substratum where it was cognized, then it must be admitted that such a thing is negated absolutely everywhere. Otherwise, it would mean the thing appears somewhere other than the substratum where it was cognized. But this is denied by the advaitin. Therefore, the unreal thing stands negated everywhere and for all times. So it is no different than a chimera which is also absolutely absent everywhere.
nacha nirupAkhyatvameva tadasattvam.h; nirupAkhyatvapadenaiva khyAyamAnatvAt.h |
nApyapratIyamAnatvamasattvam.h; asato .apratI- tau asadvailaxaNyaGYAnasya-asatpratItinirAsasya-asatpadaprayogasya chAyogAt.h |
nacha-aparoxatayA apratIyamAnatvaM tat.h; nitya- atIndriyeshhvativyApteH
Translation: (Objection continued: Nonexistence (asat) cannot be undefinable (nirupAkhya). Because, (the moment you say it is nirupAkhya), it becomes defined by the (very) word nirupAkhya! Nor can you say asat is what cannot be cognized. If asat were not cognized then there would be no cognition of anything that is different from asat. And there would be no sublation of cognition of a non-existent thing. And it would not be possible to use the word "asat". Further, you cannot define asat as that which is not cognized as being directly perceived because this would make the definition too wide (having the defect of ativyApti) due to the inclusion of eternal but supra-sensuous things.
iti chenmaivam.h |
If this is what you say, we say no (ie. your objection is not justified).
03 April 2010, 11:54 AM
advaita is not shUnyavAda
advaita-siddhi text: (MadhusUdana)
sarvatra traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM yadyapi tuchchha- anirvAchyayoH sAdhAraNam.h tathApi kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvaM atyantAsattvam.h tachcha shuktirUpye prapaJNche cha bAdhAtpUrvaM nAstyeveti na tuchchhatvApattiH |
na cha bAdhAt.h pUrvaM shuktirUpyaM prapaJNcho vA sattvena na pratIyate |
etadeva sadarthakenopAdhipadena sUchitam.h |
shUnyavAdibhiH sadadhiShThAnabhrama-anaN^gIkAreNa kvachidapy- upAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvarUpa-asadvailaxaNyasya shuktirUpye prapaJNche cha-anaN^gIkArAt.h |
Translation: Although being the counter-positive of absolute negation (negation for all times) is common between the absolutely nonexistent and the undefinable (anirvachanIya), still, what is absolute nonexistence is **incapability**of**being**cognized**as** existing**in**any**substratum. And that (incapability) is NOT either in the silver-in-nacre (the illusory silver) or in the world **before**sublation. Thus, they (the illusory silver or the world) cannot be absolutely nonexistent (as, for example, a hare's horn). For, it is not the case that the silver-in-nacre or the world is not cognized as existing (as identified with Existence).
This is precisely what is indicated by the word "upAdhi" that has Reality (sat) for its denotation (meaning).
The shUnyavAdins (Buddhists) do not agree that the basis of (any) illusion is the Reality (sat). So they do not agree that the silver-in-nacre and the world are capable of being cognized as existing in some substratum, which is what makes them (illusory entities such as the silver-in-nacre and the world) different from the absolutely non-existent.
03 April 2010, 11:57 AM
The Third Definition of Unreality
The third definition
Having seen the first two definitions of mithyAtva (unreality), we will now study the third definition of mithyAtva that MadhusUdana deals with in the advaita-siddhi.
Recall that the first definition of mithyAtva said that what is mithyA is characterized by "sadasadanadhikaraNatva", not being the substratum of either sat (Existence) or asat (nonexistence).
And the second definition of mithyAtva said that what is mithyA (unreal) is characterized as being the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation in the very substratum where it (the thing that is mithyA) is cognized.
The third definition that is now taken up in the advaita-siddhi simply says:
GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |
Alternatively, unreality is the property of being sublated by knowledge or cognition.
This is an extremely pithy definition which must only be understood by careful analysis, not just brushed off as something obvious and trivial. The definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya, PrakAshAtman.
First of all, let us do a simple analysis. We know that GYAna and aGYAna are like light and darkness. aGYAna, ignorance is sublated, negated by GYAna. Further, what is aGYAna, ignorance, is also unreal. If I am ignorant of something, I have erroneous information about that thing. This erroneous information does not represent any true state of affairs. So it is false. When do I eliminate the erroneous information? Only when I have the correct information, GYAna of the thing in question.
Next, let us try to analyse the definition in a deeper and technical manner using nyAya. In any philosophical debate, any definitions that you make must be unambiguous and must withstand close scrutiny by the opponent. This is especially true in the advaita-siddhi context because the opponents here happen to be led by the mAdhva exponent VyAsa-tIrtha, who in the words of contemporary mAdhva scholar BNK Sharma (if my memory serves me right), subjects all theories to "microscopic scrutiny." We'd better make sure the definition is "air-tight" with no holes whatsoever.
A significant difficulty with the definition, when we take a closer look, is this. The definition should apply to ordinary cases of illusion such as the silver-in-nacre and snake-on-rope as well as the quite extra-ordinary and fantastic illusion of the world on Brahman. The cognition of the rope as rope (or nacre as nacre) ends the ordinary illusion. Now what ends the illusion of the world? Surely, Brahman cannot be cognized in the same objective way that a piece of rope or nacre is cognized. The cognition of an object, such as a rope, of the form of "this is a rope" is fundamentally different from the GYAna of Brahman or BrahmasAxAtkAra, the direct realization of Brahman.
What is it that is so fundamentally different between the two types of GYAna? Let us investigate further with the help of nyAya, more specifially the tarka-saMgraha of aNNaMbhaTTa.
tatra niShprakArakaM GYAnaM nirvikalpakam.h|
saprakArakaM GYAna savikalpakam.h |
An indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka-GYAna) is one with no attribute (prakAra). A determinate cognition (savikalpaka-GYAna) is one with an attribute (prakAra).
Any savikalpaka-GYAna can be broken down into three components, as per nyAya. Or more precisely, any savikalpaka-GYAna has an objective content (viShaya) consisting of 1) a visheShya or qualificand, 2) a visheShaNa (also prakAra), ie. a qualifier, and 3) a saMsarga or relation between the qualificand and qualifier. This also corresponds roughly to the subject-predicate form of a sentence in natural language. Consider the Sanskrit sentence "nIlo ghaTaH" (the pot is blue.) Here the visheShya is "pot", the visheShaNa is "nIla" and the relation between them is that of inherence of blue color in the pot. Such a relation is called "samavAya" in nyAya.
In the language of navya-nyAya, the cognition corresponding to the sentence (nIlo ghaTaH) is analysed as follows:
nIlatva-avachchhinnaprakAratAnirUpita-ghaTatva-avachchhinna- visheShyatAnirUpita-samavAyatva-avachchhinna-saMsargatA- nirUpita-viShayitAshAli-GYAnam.h |
An awkward English translation is: It is a cognition whose subjectness is described by the qualific and ness delimited by potness, described by the qualifierness delimited by blue-ness, and described by the relation-ness delimited by inherence-ness. The naiyAyikas say that in a nirvikalpaka cognition, it is not possible to identify the visheShya, the visheShaNa, and the saMsarga, even though they may be present.
This is where the advaitins part company with the naiyAyikas. The advaitins hold that in a nirvikalpaka-GYAna, only Existence (Brahman) is presented. There is no visheShya, no visheShaNa, no saMsarga.
Finally now, we can be satisified that the definition of mithyAtva as "GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h" applies to ordinary illusions as well as the world-on-Brahman illusion. When an ordinary illusion such as a snake-on-rope is negated in an ordinary fashion, the cognition which negates the illusion is the savikalpaka type, "this is a rope." When the world-illusion is negated by Brahma-GYAna, this GYAna is of the nirvikalpaka type. In the next part, we will see how the opponent launches a new line of attack on the definition.
03 April 2010, 12:00 PM
Objections to the Third Definition
In this part, we will study the objections raised by the opponent against the definition of mithyAtva as being sublated by GYAna.
GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |
nanu - uttaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne ativyAptiH, mudgarapAtAdinivartye cha ghaTAdAv-avyAptiH, GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAmapyayaM doShaH, adhiShThAna- sAXAtkAratvena nivartye shuktirajatAdau cha GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva-abhAvAt.h sAdhyavikalatA, GYAnatvavyApya- dharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAM GYAnatvavyApyena smR^iti- tvena GYAnanivartye saMskAre ativyAptiH –
Translation ----------- Definition: Alternatively, unreality is the property of being sublated by knowledge or cognition.
Objection by oppponent: This definition of mithyAtva, ie. GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam, is too wide (ativyApti) in the case of a cognition's being sublated by a subsequent cognition.
And in the case of a pot's being destroyed by stroke of a hammer, the definition would be too narrow (avyApti).
If the intention is that unreality consists in being sublated by cognition as cognition, (GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva) even then there is the same defect, ie. of being too narrow.
Further, in the case of the illusion of silver in nacre, the sublation of the illusory silver is due to the direct realization of the substratum, ie. the nacre, (adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAra), and there is no sublation due to cognition as cognition, which leads to the defect of sAdhyavikalatA, ie. the definition is defective.
If the definition means that unreality is what is sublated by a property concomitant with the property of being a cognition (GYAnatva-vyApya-dharma), in the case of a memory (smR^iti) that sublates a mental impression (saMskAra), the definition is too wide.
As BrahmAnanda's GauDabrahmAnandI clarifies, this third definition is based on the shruti itself.
'vidvAnnAmarUpAdvimukta' ityAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha - GYAnanivartyatvaM veti |
A different sAdhya (thing to be proved, ie definition) is (now) stated, as per the interpretation of the shruti "The knower of Brahman is free from names and forms."
Let us now examine the objection of the opponent point bypoint.
1) Definition is too wide
First of all, he says that the definition has the defect of being too wide (ativyApti). How? In the case of a cognition being replaced by a subsequent cognition, the first cognition though "out of focus" right now is certainly not false. Suppose, I see the sun rising in the East and next I see a cow. At that moment when I am cognizing the cow, the cognition of the sun is in the background or out of focus, so to speak, being displaced by the cognition of the cow. Does it mean my cognition of the sun is false. No. The definition is too wide because it seems to apply to this case where a cognition is displaced or sublated in some sense by a subsequent cognition.
2) Definition is too narrow
Next, the opponent says that in the case of a pot being destroyed by stroke of a hammer, thereby driving the pot into nonexistence, the definition is too narrow. The advaitin claims that things such as a pot are sublated by GYAna alone. Clearly, the opponent says, the pot is not existent any more after being destroyed. So it should be sublated. But what destroys or sublates the pot is not GYAna, but something as simple as the stroke of a hammer!
3) What if GYAnanivartyatva means GYAnatvena GYananivartyatva
The opponent now seems to anticipate a move by the advaitin to silence the charge of ativyApti. Suppose the advaitin says "By GYAnanivartyatva, we really mean that the cognition (GYAna) that sublates what is mithyA has to be considered as a cognition acting as a cognition, not anything else.
4) The charge of avyApti still holds
The opponent now says that although the advaitin has freed his definition from this defect of being too wide, the other defect of being too narrow still applies.
The GYAnatvena GYAnanivartya- tva clarification still does nothing to remove the defect in the case of the stroke of the hammer which destroys the pot.
5) The definition is flawed
Further, there is another problem with the "GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva" definition. In the case of the illusion of silver in nacre (shukti-rajata), the cause of the destruction of the illusion is not just any cognition of nacre, rather it is the cognition of that nacre which is the substratum of the illusory silver. While a person mistakes a rope for a snake in the dark, it is not sufficient to end his illusion by holding some other rope in front of him! What does end the illusion is his perceiving the rope which he mistook for a snake. In such cases of illusion, the destruction of the illusion is not by a cognition acting in its capacity as a cognition. However, the illusory thing is admitted to be mithyA. So even though mithyAtva is present, GYAnanivartyatva is absent in the illusory thing. This gives rise to the defect of sAdhya-vikalatA, ie. the definition is defective because we see that mithyAtva is really not defined as GYAnanivartyatva but as "adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAratva", which makes the advaitin's attempt to prove the GYAnanivartyatva version futile!
6) What if a sub-class of GYAna is intended
The opponent now anticipates another move by the advaitin. What if GYAnanivartyatva is taken to mean "GYAnatvavyApya- dharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva", ie. what is illusory is sublated by a sub-class of GYAna, not just GYAna in general.
7) Still the definition is too wide
There is still a problem with the definition, says the opponent. Consider smR^iti or memory which is a sub-class of GYAna, ie. a specific kind of GYAna. The tarkasaMgraha of annaMbhaTTa defines smR^iti as "saMskAramAtrajanyaM GYAnaM smR^itiH", memory or recollection is cognition caused by reminiscent impression alone. So it is clear that recollections are a sub-class or a specific kind of cognition. The opponent, however, contends that whenever a recollection occurs, the corresponding reminiscent impression (saMskAra) that caused it gets destroyed. In this case, the saMskAra, though destroyed by the smR^iti is not considered false. So, once again, we have a case where the definition of mithyAtva is too wide.
This last objection by the opponent is quite shaky at the outset. First of all, even the naiyAyikas are divided regarding whether the saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti that it gives rise to. The older nyAya-vaisheShika school holds that the saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti but logicians of the newer navya-nyAya school tend to side with the advaitins in rejecting this theory. The VedAnta-paribhAShA says: na hi smR^iteH saMskAranAshakatva niyamaH, smR^itidhArA-darshanAt.h - there is no rule that recollection destroys saMskAra because a flow of recollection is observed. Therefore, the very premise of the objection is questionable. But still, the opponent might persist in challenging the advaita position that smR^iti does not destroy saMskAra. As we shall see, MadhusUdana's reply makes the last objection irrelevant even if this advaita position regarding smR^iti is notadmitted.
MadhusUdana begins his reply thus (as usual): iti chenna | If this is what you contend, we say no (your objections are not justified).
03 April 2010, 12:03 PM
MadhusUdana's reply to the Objections to the Third Definition of Unreality
|| shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
Invocation (First verse of the laghuchandrikA - GauDabrahmAnandI)
namo navaghanashyAmakAmakAmitadehine |
Obeisance to the householder (Krishna) whose appearance
resembles a fresh dark cloud, whose (beautiful) form
is desired even by kAmadeva (manmatha even though he is
extremely handsome himself), who desires the particles of flattened
rice brought by sudAmA the brAhmaNa, despite the fact that
He is the desirer(Lord) of the Goddess of Wealth, kamalA (lakShmI).
shuktiGYAnena rUpyaM naShTamiti kadApyananubhavena tatrApyavyApteshcha |
etAvantaM kAlaM shuktyaGYAnamAsId-bhrama AsIdityanubhavena shuktivatsatye
aGYAnabhramAdau shuktiGYAnena tadaGYAnaM naShTamityanubhavena GYAnatvena
GYAnanivartyatvasya sattvenAtivyApteshcha |
VyAsa tIrtha says that there is never an experience of the destruction of the silver due to the knowledge of nacre. No person ever feels, "The silver (of the illusion) was destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre" but only feels "all this while, there was an ignorance of nacre and there was an illusion." Therefore the definition is too narrow (avyApti) and does not cover the case of the silver-on-nacre erroneous cognition (bhrama). In other words, the knowledge of nacre does not remove the false silver.
However, there is the experience that the bhrama and ignorance (ajnAna) get destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre (shuktijnAna). But the ajnAna that has the a real substratum (nacre) is itself real. And this real ajnAna is removed by jnAna. This makes the definition suffer from the defect of being too wide (ativyApti), because a real thing (the ignorance, aGYAna) is removed by knowledge (in its capacity as knowledge) and not an unreal thing.
Summarizing his arguments, VyAsa tIrtha says:
vijnAnanAshyatA mithyArUpyAdau nAnubhUyate |
kiMtvadhiShThAnavat-satye tadajnAne .nubhUyate ||
The destruction of an unreal thing due to knowledge, such as the silver (in nacre), is not experienced. But, (the destruction) of the real ignorance of the substratum (the nacre) is experienced.
What VyAsatIrtha means here is that there are two defects in the definition of mithyAtva –
jnananivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h.
1)Although the silver that is perceived in error instead of the nacre, is mithyA (false), nobody experiences the destruction (sublation) of this silver as being due to knowledge. Therefore the definition is too narrow, since it does not apply to a thing that is mithyA.
2) The ignorance of the nacre which is the substratum (of the false silver) is real. However, it is this ignorance that gets destroyed by the knowledge of the substratum, nacre. Therefore the definition is too wide, because it applies to a thing, the ignorance, that is not mithyA.
It is necessary to understand the mAdhva explanation of error or ayathArthajnAna. This is stated in the prAmANapaddhati of JayatIrtha:
asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityuttarakAlInAnubhavAchchhuktireva-
atyanta-asadrajatAtmanA pratibhAtItyAchAryAH |
(With respect to the error of silver in nacre), the experience "The false silver appeared (before me)" occurs after (the bhrama is over). It follows that the nacre itself appears as the absolutely false silver. This is what the AchArya (madhvAchArya) says.
This is based on Madhva's theory of error that is put forth, for example in the ViShNu-tattva-vinirNaya:
na cha shukteH rajatatvaM sadasadvilakShaNam.h |
asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityanubhavAt.h ||
The (erroneous) silverness of the nacre is not different from reality and unreality (as claimed by advaitins) because of the experience "the false silver appeared" (after the illusion has ended).
Janardana's TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati makes it clear that the mAdhva position is different from the naiyAyika position.
nanu evaM naiyAyikamatAnna visheSha AchAryamatasya | tairapi
kArAdityata Aha "atyanteti" | kutrApi kadA .pyavidyamAnetyarthaH |
To meet the objection: "This position of MadhvAchArya does not differ from the naiyAyika position. Even they (naiyAyikas) accept that the silver that does not occur in the nacre occurs elsewhere and it appears (erroneously) in the nacre.",(the AchArya) uses the term "atyanta". (This means) that which does not occur anywhere, at any time. The mAdhvas, however, ignore what happens *during* the illusion phase, since their emphasis is on the reflection *after* the illusion is over (bhramottarakAle shuktiviShyakaparAmarshAt.h).
For example, there is no explanation of how or why there is an activity (pravR^itti) based on the illusory object, silver. A person may, upon mistaking the nacre to be silver, proceed to pick it up. mAnameyodaya, a treatise on the pUrva mImAMsA, remarks, in different context, how this pravR^itti is to be considered.
"tattat.h GYAnasya svaviShaya eva pravR^ittikaratvaniyamAdrajataGYAnasyApi
idaMviShayatvAbhAve tatra pravR^ittirna sidhyet.h"
Any cognition can only lead to activity based on its own object or content (of the cognition). Therefore, if the object (content) of the cognition of silver is not the "this" (the object lying before the person under illusion), then there would be no activity in this case.
The mAdhva theory of error, referred to as abhinava-anyathAkhyAti by ShrI rAghavendrasvAmI in his TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati, differs from those of other realist systems such as nyAya and vishiShTa-advaita.
nyAya puts forth what is termed anyathAkhyAti. What is seen is silver that is present elsewhere but is (erroneously) presented here in place of the nacre. "sarvathA .asatve pratItyanupapattestatraiva sattve vA bAdhAnupapattiriti" - If the silver were completely false, it would not have appeared (before the observer). If it were present right in the place where it was perceived, there would be no sublation (of such a perception).
The maNikaNa, a summary of the tattvachintAmaNi of Gangesha, says - "rajatatvena purovartinaM jAnAmi ityanuvyavasAyAd-eva anyathAkhyAtisiddhiH" - by the realization "I cognize what is before me as silver", the cognition of one thing as another (anyathAkhyAti) is established.
GYAna-prayukta-avasthitisAmAnya-viraha-pratiyogitvaM hi GYAnanivartyatvam.h |
avasthitishcha dvedhA; svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha ; satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h |
tathAcha mudgarapAtena ghaTasya svarUpeNa-avasthitivirahe .api kAraNAtmanA avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h brahmaGYAnaprayukta eva sa iti nAtItaghaTAdAv-avyAptiH|
GYAnanivartyatva or the property of being sublated by GYAna is exactly the property of being the counterpositive of a negation of existence in general (all forms) such that the GYAna of the substratum is concomitant with the negation. And existence of a thing can be of two kinds - 1) in its own form and 2) in the form of the cause, since this follows from the theory of satkAryavAda that holds that the effect exists in the cause (in a causal form). Accordingly, even though there is a negation of the existence of a pot in its form due to stroke of a hammer, there is no negation of existence of the pot in its causal form (after being destroyed by a hammer, because the pot still exists in its causal form as clay from which it was originally produced). The (negation of existence in its causal form) is only by the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the definition of mithyAtva is not too narrow (as you contend), in the case of things of the past such as a pot (after being struck by a hammer).
It is important to understand the term "GYAnaprayukta" as used by MadhusUdana here. BrahmAnanda defines it in his GauDabrahmAnandI as "adhiShThAnatatvaGYAnavyApaka", ie. such that the cognition of the substratum is concomitant with it (ie. the negation of existence in all forms). This is equivalent to saying: Wherever there is the cognition of the substratum there is the negation of the thing that is mithyA (superimposed on the substratum) in all its forms.
avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - BrahmAnanda defines it as "svasvIyasaMskAra-anyatarasya-abhAva, the negation of (a thing) as itself and its saMskAra, reminiscent impression. In the case of aGYAna, ignorance, MadhusUdana's expression "svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha" means "aGYAna-tatprayuktasvarUpeNa sthUla-avasthAkAraNIbhUta-saMskArarupeNa cha", aGYAna and the reminiscent impression that is the cause of its gross form and that the aGYAna is concomitant with.
ataevottaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne na siddhasAdhanam.h; navA
viyadAdau brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api tadvadeva mithyAtva-asiddhyA-
arthAntaram.h; uttaraGYAnena lInasya pUrvaGYAnasya svakAraNAtmanA-
For this reason, there can be no charge of a redundant proof in the case of the sublation of a previous cognition by a subsequent cognition.Nor can there be a charge of proving something other than what was intended to be proved in the case of space, etc., that are destroyed by knowledge of Brahman, on the grounds that their unreality is not established in the same way (that the unreality of a previous cognition is not established).
This follows from the fact that the previous cognition exists in its causal form and thus the negation of its existence in general cannot be established.In the case of a cognition being sublated by a subsequent cognition, the first cognition continues to exist in its causal state (as saMskAra or reminiscent impression in the mind). In the case of a things such as AkAsha,or anything in the world of duality, being destroyed by Brahman knowledge, there is total destruction of these things in their causal and own forms as well. It cannot be claimed that the unreality of these things is not established and that there is an error of proving something other than what was intended to be proved.
Om Namah Shivaya
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